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Although China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR)
is often overlooked or neglected, it is of significant im-
portance in that the region could prove to be a major factor
in the success or failure of China's current modernization
effort. Containing one-sixth of China's landmass, Xinjiang
is a cornucopia of vital resources such as petroleum, uranium
and tungsten.
On the other hand, there are elements present which invite
both domestic unrest and foreign intervention thus making
Xinjiang an achilles heel. Foremost, are the fourteen dif-
ferent nationalities which account for more than half of the
region's population. Another troublesome element is the
XUAR's geographic location which is conterminous with the
Soviet Union as well as remote from Beijing.
This thesis will examine the extent of Xinjiang's assets
in natural resources and, contrarily, its vulnerabilities in
both geography and strategic location. The major hypothesis
involved is that if the XUAR's assets can be maximized and
its vulnerabilities minimized then the region will contribute
greatly to China's modernization effort.
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I. XINJIANG AND THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS
I believe that if only our subjective activity
matches objective natural and economic laws, will the
richly endowed great northwest paint the newest and
most beautiful picture in our country's four modern-
izations. If handled properly, the northwest can
surpass the area south of the Yangtze. .
.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region* or Sinkiang as it used
to be called is a land of many contrasts: a linguistic melt-
ing pot for the Sino-Tibetan, Indo-European, and Altaic
languages; the concourse upon which eastern and western cul-
tures met via the ancient silk and jade caravan routes; and
an interface between the Islamic and Buddhist religious
worlds (see Figure 1.1). Above all else, however, it is the
field in which the seeds of modern China's future will pos-
sibly be sown.
Although the current modernization effort, known as the
"Four Modernizations,"** has not impacted as greatly on
Xinjiang as it has on eastern China, Xinjiang will more than
likely affect the future course of the four modernizations.
With its wealth of resources and sparse population the region
could potentially provide China with the large quantities of
*
Hereafter referred to as Xinjiang or XUAR.
**
The "Four Modernizations" is the name given to the
collective modernization of agriculture, industry, science
and technology, and defense.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Figure 1.1
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, China: A Statistical
Compendium , ER 79-10374, p. ii.
Note: For detailed locations refer throughout to




surplus (and therefore exportable) resources so desperately
needed to bring in foreign currency with which to pay for
modern technology and equipment.
However, before the linkages between Xinjiang's resources
and China's modernization can be understood, an examination
of its background and the political and economic forces which
are at once driving it forward and holding it in restraint
must be made.
China today, has reached a major political and economic
crossroad and unless Deng Xiaoping (China's behind the scenes
political leader) is able to effectively carry out the four
modernizations, its future as a strong international actor
and nation-state will remain in question. To succeed, Deng
will have to simultaneously prove himself to be a master of
economic juggling and an adroit walker of the political tight-
rope. If he fails at either task it will spell disaster for
his entire pragmatic act.
itWhen the "twice-purged Deng" returned to power in July
19 77, the idea of the four modernizations had been around
since Zhou Enlai's speech before the Third National People's
Congress in December 1964. In the prevailing pragmatic
climate Zhou had called for the modernization of industry,
*
Deng Xiaoping was purged in 19 66, rehabilitated in 19 73,
and purged again April 19 76 after the death of Zhou Enlai.
10

agriculture, defense, and science and technology. He also
urged that trade be expanded and foreign technology be studied.
This pragmatic approach, however, never grew to fruition
as China, hardly over the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF)
,
became engulfed in the radical policies of the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) . By the time the GPCR had
wound down from its most virulent phase China's economic sys-
tem was in total disarray. "Responsibilities had been blurred;
skilled managers and workers had been removed to unskilled
posts as punishments; and the relationship between the control
2
and local authorities was confused." Both heavy and light
industries which were in need of modernization in 19 6 4 were
now all the more ill-equipped to handle China's needs. The
growing petroleum industry was in need of a supportive petro-
chemical industry and agriculture found itself wanting for
requisite fertilizers. Against this background Premier Zhou
Enlai, and later Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, renewed Zhou's
four modernization program which was given formal approval at
the National People's Congress in January 19 75.
However, with the death of Zhou in January 1976, the
undercurrent of opposition— later labelled as the "Gang of
*
Four" — arose to openly criticize Deng and his associates
and succeeded in having him purged for the second time.
*





At that moment it appeared as though the four modernizations
were doomed to a second demise at the hands of political
opposition.
After Mao Zedong died in October, Hua Guofeng, Zhou's
successor as premier, moved quickly to mobilize his supporters
and in a lightening move arrested 30 top radical leaders in-
cluding the Gang of Four who were attempting to have Jiang
Qing (Mao's widow) named as Mao's successor. With the radical
leaders in prison Hua who had recently thought of as a tem-
porary compromise premier, had himself declared not only
premier, but also chairman of the Central Committee of the
CCP (succeeding Mao) and Chairman of the Military Commission.
The stage was now set for the rehabilitation of both Deng
and the four modernizations.
Within a few weeks of assuming control the new govern-
ment declared its support for Zhou's four modernizations,
and emphasized economic development based on a series of new
principles of economic management. "In blaming China's
economic ills on the Gang of Four, and calling for the eli-
mination of their ideas, the government. . .managed at one and
the same time to discredit a good deal of what had hitherto
passed for Maoist economics..."
In order to push ahead with the four modernizations, the
government's first order of business was to reorganize econ-
omic management from top to bottom and to implement centralized
planning control. During the previous ten years of GPCR
12

turmoil skilled managers and technocrats who had any associa-
with the pragmatic modernization effort of the mid-19 60s were
fired and subjected to mass criticism. In their place were
put cadre whose qualifications were based more on political
allegiance than any economic or managerial skills. As well,
"the political upheaval. . .had clearly encouraged safety-first,
low-profile attitudes and an unwillingness to enforce even
4
elementary standards of management and accounting." What
this meant was that Hua inherited an economic system that was
totally inefficient, pervaded with cronyism, and recalcitrant
towards government control.
To facilitate implementation of his economic program,
restore effective planning control by the center, and over-
come lower level opposition, Hua launched a series of both
general and sectoral conferences. In 19 77 alone there were
over forty major economic conferences designed to convey the
administration's commitment to modernization and managerial
rationality. To placate restive workers and increase pro-
ductivity the government also allowed wages to rise for the
first time since 1963.
Hua's overall economic policies followed those basically
outlined by Zhou and Deng in 19 75 with the exception that
a great deal more emphasis was placed on the purchase of
foreign technology and equipment. As presented at the Fifth
National People's Congress in March 19 78, his plan called
for two- stage development: a ten-year, short-term development
13

plan, and a twenty- three year, long-term comprehensive plan.
The short-term plan called for 400 million metric tons of
grain production, a 60 million ton capacity for steel pro-
duction, and an overall ten percent per year increase in
industrial production by 19 85. The ten-year plan also called
for at least 85 percent mechanization in all major processes
of farm work in the communes. The ten-year plan was to be
followed by a series of five-year plans to push China "into
the front ranks of the world economy."
With Deng working behind the scenes the resurrected four
modernizations got off to a big start in 1978 with over 1,000
capital construction projects underway. As one can see from
figure 1.2, these projects covered a broad spectrum of indus-
tries. Concurrently, and on an unprecedented scale, China
assigned a major role to massive imports of Western equipment,
complete plants and technology. In February an eight-year
trade agreement was signed with Japan involving $10 billion
worth of Chinese oil and coal for an equal amount of Japanese
plant and equipment. At midyear a trade agreement was signed
with the European Community setting up a framework for expanded
trade and by year end several technical cooperation agreements
had been signed with foreign countries and organizations.
Beijing also began to send students abroad to study science
and technology and opened China up to foreign scholars,














8— ©— O—. O
*s& © • o <ki t ^ o
>- o-.o ©&
&i
More thon 1.000 major protects were storied In
1978. A third hos been completed or oort.ody com-
muted. The mop shows o few of thern.
1. Mono? RNer Hydrooower Sutton
2. Xin(iong P»t.-och«m«:oi Wom
X Turpon (Southern i.n
:
,ong Raiiwoy)
4. Korlo (Southern X.nj.ong Railway)
5. Ycngbc (am Geothermol- Power Station
4. Xinlng (Qinghai-Xizonq Railway)
7. Golmud (QinqhofXicaflQ, Raiiwoy)
A. longyangna Hydropower Station
f. Lanzhou *ot»f suoplf project
10. Wool top milt and oil refinery in Ylnchuan
11. Oingtongna water control protect
IX Fengjiashan Reiervoir
13. Coking plant of the Taiyuon Iron and Steel
Company
14. Chengdu water supply project
15. Chongqing (Xiongfan-Chongqmg Railway)
14. Xiangfan {Xlanqfan-Chongqmg Railway)
17. Panzhihua Iron and Steel Compony
14, Sichuan Vlnylon Mill
If. Gezhoubo Hvdropower Station
30. Zhkheng CZhichenq-buzhou RaWwov)
31. Uuzhou (Zhicheng.liuchou Railway)
22. Wuhan Iron an4 Steel Company s 1 7-met re
rolling mill and Wuhan Petrochemical Worts
23. Houiuo Coai-Oretting Plant
24. Chishui Natural Gas and Chemical Plant
25. Hech* Nitrogenous Fertilizer Plant
24. Chongiha water supply project







Baoshan iron and Steel Compiei. Shanqhal
Petrochemical Compiei and Shanghai Camera
Factory
Sintering plant of the Hongihou Iron and
Stee4 Works
Zheiiang Oil Refinery
OiiKishon Chemicai Fertilizer Plant and Lun-





Housing construction ond camera factory.
Beiring.
Beidogong Power P*ant and Tlanim Petroche-
mical ond Chemtcol Fibre Compiei
Oouhe Power Plant. Tangshan
Renqiu OilMeid
Liaoyong Petrochemical ond Chemical Fibre
Complex
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During 1978 the number of Chinese delegations going abroad
and foreign businessmen coming in surged as Beijing stepped
up its search for industrial technology and equipment from
Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. By the end of
the year the PRC had been involved in negotiations for about
$40 billion in complete industrial plants, modern equipment,
and related technology, and had signed contracts amounting
to $7 billion. 8
Despite China's optimism and exhuberance, however, it
was becoming apparent by mid- 19 78 that the economy was not
responding as planned. Although agricultural production was
up after three years of no increases, Chinese industrial
production results were disappointing. As heavy industry
attempted to meet goals set by the ten-year plan certain
subsectors including petroleum, coal, electric power, trans-
portation, building and a number of raw materials failed to
keep pace. The result was an acute shortage of fuel, power
and some key raw materials throughout industry accompanied
by transportation bottlenecks, causing factory closures and
9
underutilization of capacity.
Questions were also being raised as to China's ability
to pay for and absorb the projected volume of technologically
sophisticated imports. As delegations returned from abroad
they brought back with them an awareness of just how far
advanced Western technology was and the high price that was
going to have to be paid for its acquisition.
16

For China, this information only served to expose two
major weaknesses. First, in the wake of the GPCR China's
higher education system lay in shambles. Universities had
been taken over by leftist forces and branded as centers of
right wing decadence. With students being sent down to the
countryside to gain a "real" education and professors having
been harassed, the system came to a virtual standstill. "By
the mid-19 70s, university enrollments were [still] only about
one-third of what they were a decade before, and reports from
virtually all foreign visitors suggest [ed] that the campuses
... [were] ... not only politically quiescent but largely devoid
of intellectual life and in a state of academic semi-paralysis."
In essence, China was missing a whole generation of youth with
higher education— the same generation that normally would have
been called upon to cope with any massive influx of modern
technology into Chinese society.
Secondly, and more important, was the question of how
China was going to pay for "imported" modernization. In view
of the Chinese aversion to incurring large foreign debts it
was logical when Beijing began to push for the export of
China's resources (most notably coal and petroleum) to garner
foreign currency. The February 19 78 trade agreement with
Japan exemplified this policy. The government soon came to
realize, however, that as the modernization effort gained
momentum there was a corresponding increase in domestic con-
sumption of the same resources Beijing sought to export.
17

China was thus caught in a "Catch 22" in which the more it
modernized, the more it consumed the very resources needed to
purchase the technology required for further modernization.
With the existing infrastructural problems still vexing the
resource industries, particularly in the energy field, it was
obvious China could not sustain both increased domestic con-
sumption and higher magnitudes of exports.
B. CURRENT POLICIES
By the end of 19 78, it became apparent that China's economy
was adrift in a sea of modernization: not only were the
mechanics of the economy faltering, but Deng, who by now was
running the show from behind the scenes, was encountering
persistent opposition from leftist holdovers from the GPCR.
Consequently, at the Third Plenum which met in December,
the CCP formally announced that the emphasis on political
struggle of past decades had ended and that the general tasks
of the party now would focus on "socialist modernization."
The new focus, however was not on pushing for ambitious,
long-term goals but rather on remedying the conditions that
constrained rapid economic development. As a result the Ten
Year Plan announced earlier was scaled down and attention
focused on a comparatively short transitional period (19 78-




The aim of this readjustment period was threefold: cor-
rection of industrial imbalances, the restructuring of the
country's overall economic planning, and elimination of
inefficiency in the management of enterprises. In the more
than two years since implementation its results have been
mixed at best. As these will be discussed at length in later
chapters they will not be dealt with in detail at this point.
Suffice it to say, that major problems still persist today
which continue to hamper economic growth. Despite gains in
agriculture, China, in good years, is able to just stay ahead
of local consumption. In the face of natural disasters
—
floods or drought— there exists no buffer of surplus and China
is forced to import large quantities of grain.
In industry, as mentioned previously, there exists as a
consequence of rising export demands a serious shortage of
raw materials in general and energy resources in specific.
Much of this is a result of inadequate transport and infra-
structure systems, but it is also becoming apparent that
existing sources are not inexhaustible and in the near future
may be depleted if current rates of extraction are increased
further.
So, in addition to having to control political opposition,
rebuild China's higher education system and scientific com-
munity, Deng is faced with the possibility that major resource
shortages are in the near term likely to inhibit the advance
of the four modernizations. Already he has taken steps to
19

husband currently available resources through a substantial
conservation program. Simultaneously, Beijing has stepped
up its drive to seek out and develop new resource reserves.
This search has led the Chinese to regions heretofore ignored
or relegated to future development.
C. THE XINJIANG CONNECTION
One such region that has received widespread attention
is the northwest, or more specifically the Xinjiang Uygur
Autononomous Region. Containing over one-sixth of China's
total landmass, Xinjiang is rich in a variety of resources
including petroleum, coal, hydroelectric sources, uranium,
tungsten, iron and numerous other precious and non-precious
/
ferrous and non-ferrous metals. As well, with large-scale
land reclamation projects the region has slowly become abun-
dant in agricultural products such as cotton, food grains,
melons; and livestock including sheep, cattle and horses.
At present, it can also be said in the same breath that
far more remains unknown than is currently known about the
total extent of the area's resources. Over the years two
factors have contributed to this lack of knowledge. First,
the Chinese have, until recently, found resources in sufficient
quantity in the east to satisfy their industrial needs. And
secondly, Xinjiang's remoteness and China's poor transporta-
tion network have precluded any major exploitation of the
region's resources from being seriously considered.
20

In the future, before any major exploitation effort is
undertaken, Beijing will additionally have to contend with
regional elements that, in themselves, could invite both
domestic unrest and foreign interference thereby having an
undesirable effect on the four modernizations. Foremost are
the region's fourteen different nationalities which account
for more than half of its population. Fiercely independent,
many of these minorities are Islamic in religion and, after
years of prejudicial treatment by the Han,* are anti-Han in
sentiment. Another troublesome element is Xinjiang's geo-
graphic location which is conterminous with the Soviet Union
as well as remote from Beijing. Combined with the Soviet's
historical involvement in the region these factors have made
Xinjiang extremely vulnerable and have caused it to be
referred to as China's "achilles heel."
In summary, China is going to be confronted in the imme-
diate future with some major decisions that will possibly
necessitate a shift in strategic interests and policies. If
Beijing turns to Xinjiang to alleviate China's pressing re-
source shortages, as is the author's belief, it will involve
not only a change in the direction of capital investment flow,
but as well, a rethinking of China's defense posture. Addi-
tionally, due consideration will have to be given to Beijing's
*




minority policies which in the past have tended to arouse
hostility rather than induce cooperation.
22





Source: W.A.D. Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands
(Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand Co. , 19 6 8)
,
p. 78ff.
From its terrain to its people, Xinjiang, the westernmost
and largest province in China, is a land of variety and con-
trasts. Containing more than 650,000 square miles or one
sixth of China's landmass, Xinjiang is composed of two large
basin areas: The Junggar (Dzungarian) and the Tarim which
are each enclosed by imposing mountain ranges (see Figure 2.1)




50 5 feet below sea level in the Turpan (Turf an) Depression.
In these extremes of altitude are found year-round snow in
the higher, and deserts of almost zero precipitation at the
lower. Temperatures, too, are highly variant with the Tarim
Basin recording an average high in summer of 115 °F and a low
in winter of -20 °F. Completing Xinjiang's variegation is the
fact that it is populated by many different and distinct
ethnic groups.
As mentioned above, Xinjiang is composed of two large
basin areas. The southern or Tarim Basin is bound by the
Kunlun mountains to the south, the Karakorums and Pamirs to
the east and Tian Shan (Heavenly Mountains) to its north.
From these imposing mountains flow innumerable streams which
are fed continuously by way of snow melts in the higher ele-
vations. These headwaters, in turn, feed into the Tarim
River which flows along the eastern and northern boundaries
of the basin. After traversing the perimeter regions for
over 1,000 miles the Tarim River empties into the salt marshes
of the Lop Nur (Lop Nor) in the western region of the
Taklimakan Desert.
To the north of the Tarim is the Junggar Basin which is
encircled by the Tian Shan Mountains to its south, the Alataw
and Tarbagatay ranges to the west, and the Altay mountains
to the north. As with the Tarim, these rugged mountain
ranges provide natural protective barriers. The Junggar,
however, has several easily accessible passes to the west
24

through breaks between the western mountain ranges. Narrow
in breadth they have, none- the- less, provided for population
movements from Turkistan into China and vice versa. Again,
as with the Tarim, the Junggar has an inhospitable desert at
its core.
B. THE PEOPLE
In both basins snow/ice melt water distribution and ele-
vation have determined Xinjiang's demography. Owen Latimore,
in an interesting observation, attributes the scattered and
14isolated ethnic societies in Xinjiang to "oases geography."
He contends that where oases have existed around the peri-
meters of the central deserts, conditions were present for
stationary cultures to evolve which, in turn, developed
regular agriculture and domesticated animals such as sheep
and donkeys. Because of the distances between oases and the
difficult terrain which intervenes, interaction between cul-
tures was sporadic at best. Only trade caravans traversing
the silk routes provided occasional communications between
these isolated settlements.
In the higher elevations on the well-watered plateau
grasslands the environment was more conducive to the evolu-
tion of nomadic pastorial people. Although the grasslands
(steppes) was not sufficient to support permanent settlements,
it did provide ideal conditions for cultures such as the
Kazakhs to thrive by grazing sheep and goats. By staying in
25

the higher elevations in summer and moving to lower elevations
in the winter, the Kazakhs have remained mobile and aloof from
the established oasis cultures.
Over the centuries, and until recently, the only common
bond between these cultures has been Islam which appeared in
Xinjiang in the eighth century A.D. For the most part, how-
ever, they have remained a fiercely independent and proud
people who have rebelled against outside rule and Han rule
in particular. In addition, these groups have had little
respect for geopolitical boundaries imposed by Russia or China
and have in the past migrated back and forth depending on the
season or political climate in either country.
In total, there are over ten different nationalities in
Xinjiang. The Chinese officially recognize the Uygur, Kazakh,
Khalkhas, Mongolian, Xibe, Tajik, Uzbek, Tartar, Hui, Kirgiz,
16
and a small group of White Russians. While many are indi-
genous, some are either refugees from Soviet Turkistan or
nomadic herdsmen caught on one side of the controlled Sino-
Soviet border and unable to return.
C. RESOURCES
Overall, Xinjiang is rich in its variety of natural re-
sources, but the total extent of these resources remains far
from known. Systematic surveying by geologists and mineral-
ogists in Xinjiang is a fairly recent phenomenon which has
to date been carried out only on a small scale.
26

The most notable of Xinjiang's resources are petroleum
and coal, both of which are found in extensive quantity in
and around the major basin areas of the Junggar and Tarim.
Because these resources are discussed at great length in
section IV, only notice of their abundance will be made at
this point.
Other natural resources including water, timber, fur
bearing animals, and minerals are found in the Tianshan and
other surrounding mountains. Iron which is found in notable
quantity in Xinjiang is mined in the vicinity of Urumqi at
several small mines. Recently it was reported that one large
and six medium iron deposits were discovered in the Gobi
Desert in eastern Xinjiang. Total recoverable iron at these
17
mines is estimated to be 250 million tons.
Tungsten and molybdenum are found near Qinghe, Fuyun,
and Wenchuan. Chromium deposits exceeding 1 million tons
have been found in the Zhayier Mountains in the northwest
18part of the Junggar Basin. Copper deposits are worked in
the Baicheng-Kuche area, while lead, zinc and silver are
mined west of Kaxgar at Wuqia and east of Yining at Nilike.
Placer and lode deposits of gold exist in the Altai district
19
and in the Kunlun Mountains.
Additionally, Xinjiang has substantial deposits of
radioactive elements in both the southern and northern
mountains and in the western portion of the Tianshan. Accord-
ing to K. P. Wang, Czech scientists reported that the Chinese
27

started to use lithium-7, which was easily procurable in
Xinjiang, to produce a thermonuclear fuel for the detonation
of atomic bombs.
A final mineral worth mentioning is sodium chloride or
salt. Xinjiang produces over 450,0 00 tons of salt annually
from its more than 120 salt lakes. Of this 400,000 tons is
exported to other regions. In one location near Akqi there
is a salt dome that covers more than 16 square kilometers
21
and is 1,000 meters thick. In addition to sodium chloride
the region is a major producer of sodium sulfate which is
used in the manufacture of medicines, dyes and glass. From
Xinjiang, it is exported not only to other regions in China,
but to Southeast Asia as well.
D. AGRICULTURE
Xinjiang's agriculture exists basically along fertile
belts that skirt the two major basin areas (see Figure 2.2).
In these belts Xinjiang receives the majority of its rainfall
and the temperatures are more mild. Between 15 and 20 percent
it
of Xinjiang's total area, or about 760 million mou , is suit-
able for animal husbandry, either on a seasonal or year-round
basis. Two- thirds of the total pasturage is located along
the fringes of the Junggar Basin, primarily in the Yili,
Tacheng, and Altai districts. There, nearly 40 percent of the
A mou equals .067 hectares or .1647 acres.
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Source: Donald H. McMillen, Chinese Communist Power
and Policy in Xinjiang. 1949-1977 (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1979) p. 6.
population is engaged in animal husbandry. About 10 percent
of the region's total population has traditionally been
pastoralists, being predominantly Kazakhs and Mongols in the
north and Kirgiz and Tajiks in the western regions of the
22Tarim Basin. Livestock raised in Xinjiang includes horses,
camels, sheep, goats, pigs and cattle. In 1978-79 China,
confident of Xinjiang's livestock potential, began a pilot





Prior to 1949, oasis agriculture in southern Xinjiang
accounted for most of the regions cultivated land and occu-
pied almost half of the population. Since that time, and
with the guidance of the Production Construction Corps,
Xinjiang's cultivated land has been greatly expanded through
major irrigation and land reclamation projects. In 1949, the
region's total cultivated land area was estimated at 16.7
million mou . Today, there are over 17 million mou under
24
cultivation in southern Xinjiang alone.
In this region are grown oil bearing crops such as rape-
seed, linseed, sunflowers, sesame, peanuts, soyabean, walnuts
and almonds. Cotton, another industrial crop, is grown ex-
tensively in the Turpan Basin and is of the long-fiber variety,
In 19 80, the Tarim and Turpan areas produced over 15,000 tons
25
of cotton. Agricultural foodstuffs include world-famous
Hami melons and Turpan grapes, as well as apples, dates,
wheat, rice and sugar beets. In 19 80, it was reported that
reclamation areas harvested 200,000 tons of grain, and 350,000
mou of sugar beets were sown.
As agriculture becomes more mechanized, specialized, and
receives the benefits of modern technology, Xinjiang's pro-
duction capabilities should increase dramatically. The
region's peripheral geography is in some ways extremely sim-
ilar to that of the San Joaquin and Imperial valleys in
California. Many of the same soil conditions (fertile, but
subject to leaching) , and irrigation problems are present in
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Xinjiang as they are in these valleys. Accordingly, Xinjiang
could potentially become a major food supplier for the rest




III. HAN POLICIES AND SOVIET INFLUENCE
A. 1912-19 49: WARLORDS AND SOVIETS
Formally organized as a province in 1884, Xinjiang, with
its diverse nationalities has proven to be an unruly step-
child. Prior to the entrance of the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) in 19 49 the area had been as wild and wooly as the
American West in the 1860 's. Far removed from the central
government in eastern China, Xinjiang had been for decades
the scene of political intrigues and internecine quarreling
between Han intendants and the non-Han, and amongst the dif-
ferent minorities themselves. Extremist warlordism had
moved Xinjiang to not only flirt openly with the Soviet
Union, but to declare its independence as the "Eastern Turk-
istan Republic."
Effective rule over the area by the Chinese had encoun-
tered several obstacles—not the least of which was the
fact that Han Chinese accounted for only six percent of the
population. The largest group, the Uygur, made up the ma-
jority. A Turkic-speaking people the Uygur were concentrated
in the Tarim Basin where they pursued a settled oasis life
of farming. The next largest ethnic group, the Kazakhs,
accounted for ten percent of the area's population. These
nomadic herdsmen frequented the Junggar steppes and were
known for their horsemanship and fighting abilities. After
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the Han which ranked third were the Khalkhas, Uzbeks, etc.,
each forming small but identifiable cultures scattered through-
out the area.
Although each of these peoples exhibited their own ethos,
most had at least two things in common: Islam and a fierce
sense of independence. Under Chinese rule these two elements
combined to produce a vitriolic anti-Han sentiment which,
over the years, had manifested itself in several violent Mos-
lem revolts which the Russians had been quick to exploit.
Fortunately for the Chinese, animosity and distrust between
ethnic groups prevented these rebellions from sustaining the
unanimity required for success. As well, Russian encourage-
ment proved limited to the extent that their own fear of re-
bellion spilling into their Central Asian domain prevailed.
Another significant obstacle to effective Chinese rule
proved to be geography. Because of the expansive landmass
which separated eastern China from Xinjiang, military sup-
port for Han rulers in times of crises proved uncertain at
best. The journey from Lanzhou westward was an arduous one
with stretches of road passing through hundreds of miles of
Gobi desert. If the elements didn't bring a military mission
to its demise, there was always the possibility of an ambush
by marauding bands of Islamic converts (Tungans) in the
Gansu region.
With it being weeks or even months before military sup-
port could be counted on from the central government, warlords
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often looked across the border to Russia for protection
against indigenous rebels. Being old hands at opportunism
in China, the Russians were more than willing to supply wea-
pons and troops in exchange for favorable trade concessions
and missions. Obviously, to maintain power and his life a
warlord had to be cunning, ruthless, suspicious of political
pretenders, and, above all, attuned to the shifting tides of
power between Russia and China. Between the fall of the
Manchu Dynasty in 1911 and the communist takeover in 19 49,
Xinjiang was ruled by a succession of such Han warlords.
The first, Yang Zeng (Yang Tseng) , ruled with an iron
hand from 1912 until his assassination in 19 28. During his
rule Yang maintained an independent, but friendly posture
towards Russia. With eastern China split between the forces
of Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-Lin) and Sun Yat-sen's Nationalists,
central government control proved ineffectual which prompted
Yang to conclude on his own several economic agreements with
the Soviet Union. Soviet consulates were established in
Urumqi, Gulja, Qoqek, Altay, and Kaxgar. In return, Yang
appointed consular officials in Semipalatinsk, Tashkent,
27Alma Ata, Zaisan, and Andijan. Through these agreements
and exchanges the Soviets enjoyed extensive economic privil-
eges and were able to extend their influence over one-sixth
of China.
Domestically, Yang repeatedly suppressed incipient in-
trigue and revolt through a combination of bribery, force,
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and nepotism. On July 7, 19 28, Yang's seventeen year tenure
came to an abrupt end when his own commissioner of foreign
affairs succeeded in having him assassinated at a dinner
party.
Jin Shuren (Chin Shu-jen) , head of the Political Depart-
ment, ascended to the governorship and was able to maintain
control through continued acts of repression and violence
until 1933. In 1931 resentment against his rule broke into
open revolt. Killings by marauding rebels and reprisal strikes
by Jin's forces spread throughout Xinjiang. Whole towns were
leveled and crops destroyed as both sides pursued a scorched
earth policy. The following year Ma Zhongying (Chung-ying)
,
a notorious Tungan military commander from Gansu (Kansu) , was
recruited by the rebels. By 19 33, forces under his command
had plundered the countryside and were threatening Urumqi.
In April of that year local forces killed Jin's younger
brother in their attempt to oust the corrupt governor. Un-
able to cope with the unrest Jin fled to the Soviet Union
and later returned to Nanjing (Nanking) where Chiang Kaishek
jailed him on charges of concluding unauthorized trade agree-
28
ments with the Soviets.
It was at this time that Xinjiang's most celebrated war-
lord came to power. A military commander educated by the
Japanese War College in Tokyo, Sheng Shicai (Sheng Shih-t'sai)
was to prove himself adept at balancing political balls,
both foreign and domestic alike. Like his predecessor he
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was cunning, ruthless and suspicious. However, with the
deeper involvement of the Japanese in China and the onset
of World War II, Sheng's balancing act became more complex
in its dimensions. No longer was it Soviet support counter-
acting rebel forces and Kuomintang interests, for now Japan's
designs on northwestern China had to be considered.
Sheng's first task was to quell the revolt which had dis-
posed of Jin Shuren. As with his precursor he turned to the
Soviets for assistance. In January 19 34, Soviet troops and
aircraft joined Sheng's forces to crush Ma Zhongying's seige
of Urumqi and drive him southward. In a move which reflected
Moscow's Machiavellian diplomacy Ma was given refuge in the
Soviet Union
—
perhaps for use at a later date should Stalin
perceive the need. Ma's brother-in-law, Ma Hushan, then
took over command of Xinjiang's rebel forces.
In May of 1935, Soviet involvement became more entrenched
when Sheng signed a five-year loan agreement for five million
29gold ruples in economic and military aid. This, of course,
was done without Chiang Kaishek's approval. With Xinjiang's
economy becoming more dependent upon the Soviet Union, Sheng
began to be more openly pro-Soviet and anti-imperialist.
This, in part, was to counteract KMT influence and thwart
suspected designs on Xinjiang.
Moscow's hold on the province tightened again when Sheng
called for renewed military assistance in May of 19 37 to
suppress yet another revolt in southern Xinjiang led by Ma
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Hushan. Under the superior firepower of Soviet tanks and
aircraft, and with internal dissention amongst its own ranks,
Ma's forces were defeated in 19 38. This time the Russian
troops did not withdraw. They, instead, set up a permanent
camp in Hami and were renamed as the "Red Army Eighth Regiment."
This trend of Soviet involvement increased as WW II al-
lied China and the Soviet Union against Japan. Xinjiang
became a pipeline for Russian war material flowing into China,
and in 19 40 an aircraft assembly plant was set up by the
Soviets in Urumqi. In 1940, a "Tin Mines" agreement was
signed giving the USSR fifty year mining rights in Xinjiang.
As the result of other verbal agreements with Sheng, Russia
began to exploit the province's mineral wealth including both
31tungsten and oil. As the Russians kept geological survey
results and mining records to themselves, China received
little compensation.
19 41 proved to be the high point in Xinjiang-Soviet
relations. However, it was also the year in which two events
took place causing Sheng to question his reliance on the
Soviets. First, on April 13, Russia and Japan signed a non-
aggression pact which placed China, and Xinjiang in parti-
cular, in an ominous situation so far as Soviet support was
concerned. Secondly, German forces crossed into Russia on
June 22, which sent the Soviet forces reeling. Not only
Soviet support, but Soviet survival was now in question.
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By early 19 42 Sheng's mind was made up. The Russians
were losing to the Germans and Chiang Kaishek was being sup-
ported by the Americans who seemed to be winning. With the
permutability of a chameleon, Sheng began an anti-communist
and anti-Soviet purge of Xinjiang. Hundreds of Soviet per-
sonnel and Chinese Communist Party cadres were jailed and
held for over a year without trial. In 19 4 3 many, including
Mao Zedong's brother, Mao Zemin, were executed after "con-
spiracy confessions" were obtained. Negotiations were com-
menced for the cessation of Soviet mineral exploration and
for the return to Chinese control of joint companies. Al-
though these negotiations would drag on for years, they
none- the- less , marked the beginning of the end for expansive
Soviet involvement in Xinjiang.
Simultaneously, Sheng opened communications with Chiang
Kaishek and expressed his desire to return to the fold and
work amicably with the Kuomintang. Madame Chiang responded
with a personal letter from the Generalisimo forgiving Sheng
of all past misdeeds and, as well, assuming responsibility
for their consequences.
What Sheng failed to foresee was that in turning against
the Soviets he had effectively cut himself off from the only
reliable military assistance capable of controlling local
rebellion. As Sheng only controlled the urban areas perhaps
he had lost sight of the festering unrest which predominated
in the rural areas. As suspicious and paranoid as Sheng was,
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this does not seem to be a plausible response. Whatever the
answer, Sheng's inability to control renewed rebellion was
to contribute in no small way to his downfall.
In the spring of 19 43, Usman Bator, an Altay Kazakh with
a reputation as a savage fighter, rose to carry the anti-Han
banner. Establishing contact with the Mongolian People's
Republic (MPR) he began to receive both arms and encouragement
in his struggle against Sheng. By June much of northern
Xinjiang was again in open rebellion. Sheng responded by
ordering a massive resettlement project designed to relocate
dissident Kazakhs from their homelands to southern Xinjiang.
Many of the angered Kazakhs chose to escape into the MPR
rather than to be moved south. The only thing accomplished
by Sheng's maneuvers was to add fuel to an already volatile
situation. In March 19 44, the rebellion had spread through-
out Xinjiang and Usman' s forces were inflicting heavy losses
on' Sheng's troops. The situation was out of control.
By October Chiang decided that he had gained enough
power over Sheng and had tired of his inability to cope with
Moslem rebellion. That same month he appointed Sheng to
the Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture, and replaced him
with Wu Zhongxin (Chung-hsin)
.
The replacement of Sheng may have allayed Chiang's fears
of allegiance in Urumqi, but it did nothing to avert further
rebellion. In November Gulja (Kuldja) came under seige by
Turki forces led by Uygur Akhmedjan Kasimov. On January 31,
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19 45, Gulja fell to the rebels and the establishment of an
"Eastern Turkistan Republic" headed by Uzbek Khan Ture was
33proclaimed. At the same time, Usman and other rebel forces
from the regions of Yili, Tarbagatay and Altay were gaining
control of northwestern Xinjiang. By July they had occupied
Qoqek (Tacheng) and were threatening Urumqi itself. Wu had
lost command over Xinjiang with the exception of his enclave
at Urumqi and even that was in doubt. Later that summer
White Russians took up arms and joined in the revolt—Chinese
rule was hanging by a tenuous thread.
In September, Chongqing (Chungking) dispatched General
Zhang Zhizhong (Chang Chih-chung) from the KMT's northwest
headquarters at Lanzhou (Lanchow) to Urumqi. With Soviet
officials mediating Chang entered into negotiations with
Akhmedjan Kasimov. The result was the agreement on "eleven
points" which guaranteed considerable cultural independence
and a share in provincial government to the minorities.
In addition, Chang replaced Wu as provincial chairman and
£e_ facto autonomy was granted to the districts of Yili, Altay
and Qoqek. Two vice chairmen, Burhan Shahidi, a Tartar, and
Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uygur, were appointed to assist in
running the government. As Masud Sabri was a member of the
KMT Central Executive Committee, Chongqing had actually




In May of 19 47, Masud succeeded General Chang as pro-
vincial chairman and commenced to organize a new government.
In doing so he completely disregarded earlier accords on
minority representation and minority affairs in general.
Outraged, the Yili group left Urumqi and renewed hostilities.
Zhang Zhizhong, who had remained behind to help with the trans-
fer of government, tried to intercede, but to no avail. It
was obvious that Moslem mistrust of the government at Urumqi
had hardened.
With the Kuomintang government collapsing in the east,
Burhan Shahidi succeeded Masud as provincial chairman on
December 31, 19 48. By July of the following year, Chiang's
forces were being routed and Peng Dehuai's (P'eng Teh-huai)
Red Army stood ready to enter the province.
In order to have a voice in the new communist government
several top rebel leaders left Yili for Beijing to partici-
pate in the government organizational proceedings. Mysteri-
ously, the whole entourage was killed in a plane crash on
August 27. With the ranks of the Turki nationalism leadership
decimated, Seypidin (Saifudin) Azizov (later known as the
"survivalist" ) assumed the role of spokesman for the rebel
cause. In this capacity he attended the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference as a representative of the
Yili people. However, once in Beijing, Seypidin spoke as a
Han Chinese when he presented the Yili revolt in an anti-




movement to achieve independence of Chinese rule. Much to
the rebels dismay, Xinjiang had produced yet another chameleon,
In October, the People's Republic of China was
formally inagurated and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
moved into Xinjiang. A new political administration at
Urumqi was installed with Burhan and Seypidin as chairman
and vice chairman respectively. In turn, Peng Dehhui and
Zhang Zhizhong were put in command of the Urumqi headquarters
of the Xinjiang military establishment. Shortly thereafter,
Usman Bator, who had continued to wage a private war against
the Chinese was captured and executed. With its leaders
either communist or dead, and a renewed friendship in the
wind between the PRC and the Soviet Union, the Yili revolt
was finished. Abruptly, an era had passed and a new one
begun, but the hatred and mistrust would be slow in dying.
B. 19 49-19 55: INITIAL COMMUNIST POLICIES
When Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the
People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, he was accutely
aware of the massive rebuilding which lay ahead. Wasting
no time he immediately set about to politically unify China
and rebuild its war torn economy.
In Xinjiang bitter anti-Han sentiment remained strong
and justifiably so. Mao realized that rebelling minorities
would contribute little to a socialist society and would be
counter-productive to any economic rehabilitation. He also
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MINORITY PEOPLE WELCOMING THE RED ARMY
Source : China's Minority Nationalities (San Francisco,
California: Red Sun Publishers, 1977)
, p. 12.
knew that past repression and forced policies had met with
disaster. Unity and equality under the socialist banner
would have to be paramount if Xinjiang were to become an
integral part of the "new" China. With this in mind Mao
approached the province aggressively, but solicitously.
Mao's first step was to legitimize the various ethnic
groups as part of China's "big fraternal and cooperative
family composed of all its nationalities." This was
43

accomplished through the central governments "Common Programme"
which was promulgated in 19 49 as a basic set of fundamental
laws for the People's Republic. Article 9 of this document
stated, "All nationalities in the People's Republic of China
shall have equal rights and duties." Article 51 of the same
document went a step further with the promise of regional
autonomy and local autonomous organizations for those areas
in which minorities are concentrated. It also gave them the
right to join the PLA and organize their own security forces.
And lastly, it gave minorities the freedom to "develop their
dialects and languages, to preserve their traditions, customs,
37
and religious beliefs."
Immediately after liberation an intense propaganda cam-
paign was launched to educate the minorities as to their rights
as equal members in the People's Republic. PLA cadres were
sent en masse to the countryside to inform the various nation-
alities of the advantages of a socialist society and, in
turn, educate themselves as the peculiarities and needs of
the minorities. Theatrical groups staged shows which demon-
strated how the government of the People's Republic would
replace discriminatory policies of former Chinese regimes
with those of fraternal respect and mutual help. As well,
PLA soldiers distributed tools and food supplies to the




Mao Zedong's second step, to rebuild the economy, was set
in motion when Peng Dehuai flew into Xinjiang in December 19 49,
to reorganize local military forces there. The former rebel
forces in the Yili region numbering 30,000 men were regrouped
as the Fifth Army while the surrendered Nationalist troops
were regrouped as the Ninth Army. In the spring of 19 50,
these forces and local PLA forces were reorganized and "ordered
to be concentrated in the steppes along the Jungar and Tarim
Basins to build irrigation works, reclaim barren lands and
to develop agriculture, animal husbandry and subsidiary
39
agriculture production."
In August, 19 54, the Chinese proceeded to regroup these
construction units, which were then engaged in "military
labor," into the "Production Construction Corps" (PCC) of
Xinjiang Military Region. This corps was to become a "com-
prehensive production unit with workers, peasants, soldiers,
students, traders, foresters, shepherds, and fishermen all
participating under the direction of Xinjiang Military Region
while still maintaining the organizational form of division,
40
regiment, battalion, company, and platoon." At this time
the organization had grown to over 200,000 men and had been
divided according to tasks into "Agricultural Construction
Divisions" and "Engineer Construction Divisions." The
former engaged in opening up barren lands, plowing and plant-
int in various reclamation districts and the latter in basic
construction work in communications, irrigation, and mining.
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In order to coordinate China's economic rebuilding and
the party line, Mao set up new and expanded existing admin-
istrative agencies. The party organization most closely
concerned with minorities work was the United Front Work
Department (UFWD) of the Party Central Committee. Originally
set up in Yenan in 19 44, the UFWD was responsible for shaping
the broad outlines of policy in minority areas in accordance
with the party line. General guidelines from the UFWD were
sent to the Nationalities Affairs Commission (NAC) which was,
in turn, charged with implementing them. Although subordin-
ate to the UFWD, the NAC, which met daily and functioned as a
41
regular ministry, wielded considerable power. Organiza-
tionally, the NAC was composed of a general office and several
departments, each dealing with the minorities of a single
large geographical area.
In 19 52 several regulations were passed by the Government
Administration Council (GAC) which further delineated minority
rights and duties. Included in these regulations was the
right of minorities to freedom of thought, speech, publication,
assembly and change of domicile. Another regulation called
42for the implementation of regional autonomy for nationalities.
In 19 53 an electoral law was promulgated stating that uni-
versal suffrage applied to all nationalities. It also set
the number of deputies to be elected by minorities to the
All-China People's Congress at 150.
46

When the Constitution of 19 54 (the PRC ' s first) was
adopted on September 20, it specifically addressed self-
government of national autonomous areas and granted minorities
the right to administer their own local finances. These areas
were also permitted to employ spoken and written languages
commonly used in the locality in conducting government bus-
iness. Unlike its Soviet counterpart, the PRC ' s constitution
43did not grant autonomous areas the right to secede.
On October 1, 19 55 with much party pomp and ceremony,
Xinjiang became Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region thus exer-
cising its constitutional right. Despite a great deal of
publicity, its impact on minority life has been debated. In
his monograph, The Hi Kazakh Autonomous Chou , George Moseley
contends that the establishment of autonomy was of no poli-
tical significance for the Kazakhs.
It merely defined an administrative area; this
might just as well have been accomplished by a decree
of the central government had it not been necessary
to satisfy an ideological requirement. The repre-
sentatives of Kazakhs who served at various levels
in the administration did not represent the interests
of their constituents; rather they implemented direc-
tions from above. Their success depended on how
enthusiastically they could advance the interests of
their state regardless of local sentiment. 44
Although autonomy may have been more of a legal document
than a reality, it did represent, in no small way, the com-
munists* sincerity at reversing past repression and racial
prejudice. It was also demonstrative of their determination
to fully incorporate Xinjiang into China's economic and
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political sphere. For many of the province's minorities
communist rule brought a welcomed respite from the constant
bloodshed and warfare of the previous decades. It may not
have brought the independence sought by Moslem groups, but
it did bring improved living standards through greater pro-
ductivity and economic planning.
Since Beijing did not initially force collectivization
in minority areas, there was minimal conflict and disruption
of life styles. The "lower cooperatives" which were intro-
duced corresponded in size to the extended family of most
minorities so their introduction to the area did not cause
the problems encountered when the larger communes were
established during the Great Leap Forward.
Overall, communist rule in the early 19 50's was both
benevolent and beneficial. Ignorance of minority customs
and religious rites posed occasional problems for Han cadre,
but compared to past prejudice it was minor in scope. Un-
fortunately, the prejudice which was not in the open, lay
just below the surface awaiting the slightest provocation.
During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution
the provocation was present and rebellion flared into the
open once again.
C. 19 56-19 76: MASS MOVEMENTS AND RADICAL SHIFTS IN POLICY
By the mid-19 50s the moderate political winds from the
east began to shift toward a more radical direction that
48

would soon engulf China, including Xinjiang in two major
upheavals -- the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Great Pro-
letarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) . The minorities honeymoon
with their communist keepers was rapidly coming to a close.
Beijing had decided that the march towards socialism was
moving too slow and that the time had come to surge ahead —
minority peculiarities notwithstanding.
In a not so subtle manner the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
began to introduce cultural policies which were aimed at
changing local customs and breaking the grip of Islam. In
August 19 56, on the advice of the Soviets, the Party adopted
a modified Cyrillic alphabet as the written script for Uygurs
,
Kazakhs, and Kirgiz. It was hoped that this reform would
allow minorities to learn modern science, eliminate illiteracy
and cultural barriers; and more importantly, erode the old
45Muslim religious teachings.
Concurrently, the Party stepped up its collectivization
efforts amongst regional pastoral minorities and instituted
more radical policies. For the Kazakhs and Kirgiz who were
used to seasonal migration with their herds, these policies
were most repugnant. Opposition to Han authority and policies
which lay close to the surface broke out in September with
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riots occurring in Hotan (Hetian) and Muyo (Muyu)
.
In the following year, during the Hundred Flowers campaign
which called for criticism against the party and government,




The outpouring of grievances from all quarters
proved shocking to the party, but nowhere more so than
from the minorities' areas. People complained that
the so-called privileges they had received were as
useful to them as "ears on a basket," and that they
had received "many rights in theory, few in practice."
Minorities' cadres were criticized as lap dogs of
the Han and traitors to their own people. Suggested
solutions ranged from pleas to give minorities more
power within the existing system to outright demands
for secession. A few angry voices even demanded that
all Han Chinese leave their areas immediately. '
As quickly as the campaign had started it came to a halt
in June with the launching of a massive rectification cam-
paign that was designed to purge the party of "rightest"
elements that had come forth in the previous two months to
attack the socialist system. The slogan "let a hundred
flowers bloom" remained official policy, but the policy was
no longer to cultivate new flowers, but to root out "poison-
ous weeds." Although minorities in general were spared in
this turn about in policy, many of the minority elites who
had served as government officials became main targets of
the rectification campaign. Singled out as "nationality
chauvinists," many minority intellectuals were sent for re-
habilitation through reeducation reform or party labor,
48depending on their age and health. Additionally, Xinjiang
Islamic Association members were sighted for placing religious
interests above those of the state.
At this time subtle hints of more drastic policies which
were to arrive with the Great Leap Forward began to appear.
Toleration and respect for minority customs and habits and
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the special customs and peculiarities of Xinjiang began to be
criticized as anti-socialist and a roadblock to exploitation
of the region's full production capabilities. A call from
the more radical Party members began to be heard for the rapid
assimilation ("fusion") of the non-Han peoples and their cul-
ture with the Han people of China. Their views on minorities
policy were part of a growing dissatisfaction among certain
members of the Chinese decision-making elite with the progress
of reforms in general and that the adopted Soviet model was
not working.
When this dissatisfaction culminated in the launching of
the Great Leap Forward in February 19 58, it affected minori-
ties* areas in many of the same ways as it did the rest of
China, including the establishment of communes, huge dining
halls, virtually compulsory day care for children, and back-
yard furnaces. It also had effects in some ways which were
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unique to minorities. Toleration of customs and culture
which had been viewed disapprovingly was not outright pro-
hibited. By August, Beijing had declared "war" against all
backward customs which stood in the way of progress and were
a hindrance to production. Also announced were new drafts
for the reform of Uygur, Kazakh, Mongol, Xibo and Kirgiz
script based on the Latin alphabet which was basically an
extension of language reform instituted in 19 56.
As intolerable as those GLF policies were they paled in
the face of the communization effort that was launched by a
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directive of the CCP National Congress and transmitted to the
XUAR via the CCP Xinjiang Committee in June 19 58. Affecting
the nomadic herdsmen the greatest, the commune structure made
no allowances for either the migrant customs of the herdsmen
nor their cultural family structure. In the words of George
Mosely:
[Communization] . . . implied . . . the dissolution of
the traditional Kazakh social structure and the reori-
entation of the individual Kazakh toward the state.
Not only the uru [clan] , but the extended- family units
(aul) which constituted it, were to be tossed on
history's rubbish heap and the individual Kazakh was
to be made into a single labor unit and applied to
the land together with any desired number of labor
units. His dispossession — what the party fancied
as his liberation — was to be total: not only were
his social values to be squeezed out of him, but he
also had to be made into a Chinese, and in this de-
nationalization process his ordeal considerably sur-
passed that endured by his Han "brothers. " 50
By the end of 19 59 tensions were high as a result of a
year of fierce and strenuous resistance to GLF policies. In
September there were reports of an uprising in Usu (Wusu) near
the Dushanzi oil fields and, in Yining (Ining) the following month
in which many Chinese were killed, and government and party
51
offices ransacked.
As a result of instability in Xinjiang and Tibet caused
by minority unrest, socio-economic dislocations caused by the
GLF, and deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing began
to back off from its most radical policies. Moderation and
gradualism toward minority assimilation became the key policy
as Beijing became concerned over the security of its borders.
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As well, Mao Zedong had resigned from his post as China's
chief of state in January 19 59, and had been replaced by Liu
Shaogi whose pragmatic policies were beginning to temper the
radical aspects of the Great Leap.
Another factor which kept Xinjiang from boiling over into
open rebellion was the moderating effect of two key personal-
ities. The first, Seypidin, who as head of the Xinjiang
Provincial People's Government, second secretary of the XUAR,
and a Uygur had become the spokesman for policy emanating from
Beijing. Having a non-Han elite explaining and justifying
Han policy to fellow minorities had the effect of sugar-
coating some bitter pills.
The other personality was Wang Enmao who had come to
Xinjiang with Peng Dehuai's army in 19 49. He had since
risen to the position of First Secretary of the XUAR CCP and
Commander of the Xinjiang Military District. Over the years
he had built up a base of significant regional power and had
maintained the personal loyalty of many troops which had
served with him both before and after his move to Xinjiang.
More importantly, he had an appreciation for minority
problems and defense vulnerabilities of the region. As a
result he attempted to insulate Xinjiang from some of the
more radical policies emanating from Beijing. In order to
maintain an air of loyalty to the center he often paid lip
service to Party dogma and occasionally offered up a sacri-
ficial cadre for rehabilitation.
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1961 saw the official death of the Great Leap when, in Janu-
ary, the Party announced a full retreat from its policies.
By then, however, the damage had been done and despite Beijing's
efforts to mollify minorities through cultural recognition
and a tolerant attitude, angered Uygurs, Kazakhs and other
Muslim elements began to cross into Kazakhstan with the help
of Soviet consular officials in Xinjiang. Exploiting minority
unrest Soviet officials were issuing passports to disgruntled
minorities and, as well, had stepped up propaganda broadcasts
which told of the good life on the other side of the border.
On May 26, the Chinese reacted by closing the border which
only incensed the minorities further. On May 29, a large
number of Uygurs and Kazakhs demonstrated before government
offices in Yining and chased Party employees from the premises.
They then staged an anti-Han demonstration which was dispersed
with gun fire by government troops. The demonstrators fled
to the Soviet consulate in Yining for aid but were refused.
As a result Chinese officials ordered the closure of both the
. . 52Yining and Urumqi consular offices.
By the time the crises subsided in the late summer, some
62,000 people had fled Xinjiang. Although the incident had
incensed the local population and similar riots were reported
elsewhere in the region, the seriousness of the situation
was lessened somewhat by the earlier retrenchment measures
in the commune movement, relaxation in the radical economic
policies of the GLF period, and the strategic retreat in the
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Party's nationalities policy. The most significant result,
in the end, was the complete exclusion of direct Soviet in-
volvement in Xinjiang. The border was closed and further
militarized, the population along it was largely relocated,
Sino-Soviet trade in Xinjiang dropped sharply, and the planned
railway link between Urumqi and Aktogai on the Soviet border
was left uncompleted. Chinese control in the Yili area,
which had so long been a pro-Soviet enclave on Chinese soil,
was thenceforth unquestionable.
Throughout 19 63 the Soviet Union intensified propaganda
broadcasts which vilified the CCP and its minority policies.
Xinjiang authorities countered this propaganda by emphasizing
the Party's concern for the minorities' livelihood and econ-
mic prosperity. As well, they proclaimed that minority
nationalities would be allowed to use their own written and
spoken languages and that their customs and habits were to
be respected. And, almost as if foreboding the next great
political storm to be unleashed from Beijing, the minorities
were told to heighten their political consciousness and
revolutionary vigilance and engage themselves in a ruthless
struggle against internal and foreign class enemies.
Never out of the picture, Mao Zedong emerged from poli-
tical seclusion in late 19 62, to launch what came to be known
as the "Socialist Education Movement." The new campaign was
an attempt to counter the bureaucratization of Chinese poli-
tical life, reverse socio-economic policies that Maoists
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condemned as "revisionist" and believed were creating new
forms of capitalism, and revitalize a collectivistic spirit
and consciousness both within the party and in society at
large.
Initially, as this campaign was aimed at bureaucratic re-
form within Party and government, it had little impact on
Xinjiang. But later, as the movement evolved into a power
struggle between Maoists and the "revisionist" forces of Liu
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, it assumed the trappings of another
radical movement designed to keep China in a state of "perm-
anent revolution. " As such it was only a matter of time be-
fore this new wave of Han socio-economic extremism was to
imprint upon the minorities of Xinjiang.
Starting in 1965, the UFWD, coordinator of minority policy,
came under increasing attacks by Maoists. Initially, these
attacks were limited to charges of capitalism against its
director, Li Weihan. However, in 19 66 the whole organization
came under assault for being a screen behind which Liu Shaoqi
and his agents had pursued their allegedly capitualistic
schemes. Liu Chun, deputy director of the UFWD, concurrent
vice-chairman of the NAC, and president of the Central Minori-
ties Institute was accused of collaborating with Liu Shaoqi'
s
plot. Wang Feng, another prominent member of the UFWD and
NAC, and later Xinjiang Party First Secretary, was removed




In addition to organizational and personnel shakeups , a
radical tack reminiscent of the GLF days, began to appear in
minority policies emanating from Beijing. Propaganda was
stepped up emphasizing material progress and general solidar-
ity. Concurrently, a campaign was launched against counter-
revolutionary and revisionist activities among the nationalities
Wang Enmao whose position within the party was becoming more
tenuous had to pay attention to the increased tempo of "build-
ing class struggles" and, yet, mindful of border security
problems, had to tread lightly with minorities.
In 1966, the brunt of the now declared Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution began to be felt in Xinjiang. Red Guards
began to pour into the region armed with "little Red Books"
and "Mao Zedong thought." Although minority participation
was nil, local Han radicals came forward to join with the
arriving Red Guards in criticizing Wang Enmao and existing
minority policy. Quoting Mao's statement that nationality
struggle was in essence simply class struggle, these radicals
sought to solve nationality problems accordingly. Groups of
Red Guards vowed to destroy vestiges of ethnic diversity:
temples were destroyed, various religious observances were
interferred with, broadcasting in minority languages was
sharply curtailed, and many minority leaders were purged for
55pandering to reactionary customs and habits.
Fortunately for the minority groups, concern was openly
voiced that stirring up ethnic animosities would only serve
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to further weaken border defense. With the urging of Zhou
Enlai cooler heads prevailed and Red Guard groups who attacked
minorities leaders were ordered to desist.
For the remainder of the GPCR its impact on Xinjiang's
minorities was minimal in comparison to other regions of China,
What it basically boiled down to in Xinjiang was a power strug-
gle between the long-dominant regional leadership of Wang
Enmao and the Mao-Lin Biao faction in Beijing that was largely
played out by Han actors. Changes that did occur were by in
large Han personnel, Han institutions and Han party policies.
Wang Enmao, long an open critic of Red Guard attacks and
radical policies, lost his power struggle and was forced out
of power in mid- 1969. He was replaced in party and military
tasks by Long Shu j in — a Mao partisan and chairman of the
*
Xinjiang Revolutionary Committee, and in government, by
Seypidin (still the "survivalist" ) . In reflection of the
waning period of the GPCR, Long Shujin's leadership was marked
by a decline in radicalism even though the minorities con-
tinued to be reminded through mass criticism of their
responsibilities to socialism.
*
Revolutionary Committees with their "triple alliance" of
mass revolutionary organizations, pro-Maoist Party cadres,
and the army were proclaimed in 19 67 as the only appropriate
form for the reorganization of political power. *6 Xinjiang's
Revolutionary Committee was established on September 5, 1968
under the chairmanship of Long Shu j in.
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This Long-Seypidin leadership lasted until the Lin Biao
affair in 19 71, at which time Long and other suspected pro-
Lin elements, were either removed from power or their role in
regional affairs drastically reduced. Increasing numbers of
cadres loyal to the new Mao-Zhou Enlai coalition in Beijing
were transferred to Xinjiang to fill posts they left vacant.
Significantly, cadres who had previously held high posts in
the regional hierarchy under Wang, but who had been purged or
criticized by Red Guards, were rehabilitated in greater
numbers after 1972.
Following the brief interim of collective rule by these
cadres a new regional leadership headed by Seypidin was of-
ficially sanctioned by Beijing in the autumn of 1973. The
new leadership was not dominated by any one individual, nor
was it monopolized by any single factional group, military or
57
otherwise. A period of tolerance and gradualism was ushered
in as Seypidin 's leadership reflected the more rational atti-
tude of Zhou and the rehabilitated vice premier, Deng Xiaoping,
With the exception of the brief anti-Confucian campaign which
was instigated by the "Gang of Four" in 19 73-74, this atmos-
phere of normality continued on through 19 76.
However, it cannot be said that from a minority's perspec-
tive conditions returned to normal. In the wake of the GPCR
Han leadership remained as entrenched as before, PLA presence
increased along the borders due to continued Sino-Soviet
tension, and amongst the population remained a large number
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of Han youth who were permanently relocated during the pre-
vious ten years. Additionally, the radical swings in Han
policies had done little to enamor minorities' sentiments
toward their Chinese Communist "brethren."
D. 19 76-19 81: MAO'S DEATH AND A PRAGMATIC TURN IN POLICY
With the deaths of Zhou Enlai in January and Mao the fol-
lowing September, 19 76 proved to be an extremely crucial year
as far as China's future was concerned. After Zhou's death
there was an immediate struggle for power between the radicals
and Deng Xiaoping to determine Zhou's successor as premier.
Apparently neither Deng nor the radicals could generate enough
support, and the position went to the relatively unknown Hua
Guofeng, who was named acting premier in February. In April,
Deng was purged and forced to leave Beijing altogether.
When Mao died, a second power struggle erupted as the
radicals tried to have Jiang Qing named to succeed her husband
as party chairman. On October 6, Hua, who had managed to
rally support from the Minister of Defense and Mao's bodyguard,
arrested 30-odd top radical leaders including the Gang of Four.
With the mainstay of opposition in prison Hua had himself de-
clared not only premier, but also chairman of the Central
Committee of the CCP (succeeding Mao) and chairman of the
Military Commission.
In July 19 77, Deng was restored to his former posts as
first vice premier, vice chairman of the party and chief of
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staff of the PLA. Since that time Deng has moved to restore
the state bureaucracy he and Liu had built up during the 19 60's
This has entailed the rehabilitation of many officials purged
during the Cultural Revolution.
In late July, Wang Feng was rehabilitated and brought into
Xinjiang to fill the posts of second secretary of the Xinjiang
CCP Committee and first vice-chairman of the Xinjiang Revolu-
tionary Committee. In addition, he was made political commis-
sar of the Xinjiang Military Region (XJMR)
.
Wang Feng's appointment to Xinjiang reflected the
general return to moderate policies following Mao's
death and the smashing of the "Gang." Being both a
Han national and an expert in minority affairs, his
position as the number-two Party man in the region
was of the utmost importance ... Significantly, Wang's
post of XJMR Political Commissar made him the leading
Party figure within the regional military establishment.
In this position ... he ... was able to oversee the
activities of his Han and non-Han counterparts.^
In early 1978, for reasons not yet made clear, Seypidin
was stripped of his posts in Xinjiang. On January 31, 19 7 8
it was announced that Wang Feng had assumed Seypidin' s posts
of Xinjiang Party First Secretary, Chairman of the Xinjiang
59Revolutionary Committee, and XJMR First Political Commissar.
The wily survivalists ' luck had finally run its course.
With Deng's return came a return to "normalcy" in minori-
ty areas. Deng, who had participated in and supported Zhou
Enlai's rational approach toward minority relations, began to
rectify the damages done over the previous two decades. The
first step was the ratification of the 19 78 Constitution on
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March 5. Article 4 guaranteed the various nationalities
equality, freedom from discrimination, right to autonomy, and
the "freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written
languages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and
6
ways." Articles 3 8 through 40 further delineated the
organs of self government in national autonomous areas. Al-
though not as detailed as the 19 54 constitution, the 19 7 8 docu-
ment guaranteed far more rights than its 19 75 predecessor
which didn't even allude to minority representation in their
own region's governmental organs.
More important than the ratification of the constitution,
however, was Deng's intention on its enforcement. As a
leader Deng was more than aware of the need to bring the
minority nationalities within the mainstream of Chinese life.
As a pragmatist he was conscious too of the need for stability
and avoidance of hostility within the minority regions which,
in many areas, bordered the Soviet Union and were defensively
vulnerable.
Demonstrative of Deng's intent was the reestablishment in
early 19 78 of the minority affairs bureaucracy — namely the
Nationalities Affairs Commission — which had been defunct
since the Cultural Revolution. From May 22 through June 7 of
19 79 it convened its first enlarged conference with Yang




1. To provide assistance in cultural and economic con-
struction in minority areas.
2. Increase capital construction in minority areas
with motor vehicles, tractors, and rolled steel.
3. Make available manpower and technical assistance.
4. Education departments were to train more minority
cadre and technicians. 61
In June, the Xinjiang Party Committee met and decided on
new regulations that would allow minority peasants and herds-
men to keep more animals and set aside more land for peasant
use. For example, those minorities engaged in animal husbandry
were allowed to keep three cows, two horses, and fifteen sheep.
Those engaged in orchard cultivation were allowed .02 hectares
of fruit trees for their own use. Not only was this in line
with spirit of "private plots" in China Proper, it was also
reflective of the special requirements of the minorities.
If 1979 was a year of rebuilding a minorities affairs
program and recognizing the different needs of the autonomous
regions, then 19 80 was a year of tying minority nationality
policy to the broader goals of China — specifically, the
four modernizations. In January 19 80 this theme was reflected
in radio broadcasts which made statements such as:
There are abundant resources in the minority regions
of our country. There are plentiful material reserves
for our four modernizations ... In order to promote the
four modernizations we must unite with the people of
the minorities to further exploit, use and protect the
rich resources in the minority regions in support of
the country's construction. 63
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In February the Xinjiang Ribao printed an editorial under
the title of "Do Nationality Work Well, Speed Up the Four
Modernizations." It called for a realization of the four
modernizations through implementing the Party's policies on
nationalities. It also stated that there were 120,000 minor-
ity nationality cadres in Xinjiang or ten times the number in
19 50 and that the regional and prefectural people's governments
64
were headed by nationalities cadres.
As if to give Beijing's minority program legitimacy, Zhou
Enlai's nationality speeches and programs from as far back as
19 57 were resurrected and given wide distribution. As Deng's
minority policies were basically patterned after those of
Zhou's this created a sense of continuity of Han concern that
6 5
was broken only by the scurrilous deeds of the gang of four.
Of course, accompanying Zhou's revival was an ongoing campaign
of mass criticism of the gang.
In accordance with the religious rights of the new consti-
tution Xinjiang saw a reopening of its mosques and a revival
of China's Islamic Association which had last met as a congress
in 1963. In 1979, 16 Chinese Muslim's were permitted to make
6 6
a pilgrimage to Mecca — the first to do so since 19 64. In
August 19 80, Beijing hosted over 600 Muslim cadres in an
Islamic festival which was repeated in various Islamic regions
throughout China including Xinjiang. Although this new tol-
erance for religion did not give rise to a wave of Pan-Islamism
in China it, nonetheless, served notice to minority leaders
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that there was more than words to Deng's nationalities
program.
In the field of education, it too, experienced revival
and rebuilding. By 19 80 it was reported that in Xinjiang
eight schools of higher learning had been reinstated and an
6 7
additional two institutions established since 19 78. Total
college enrollment of minority students was placed at 40,000.
A Beijing Review article in November 19 80, went on to say
that minority students were admitted to colleges with admis-
sion scores 10-20 points below those required of their Han
counterparts. Additionally, entrance exams were being given
in the minorities own languages, and at institutes of higher
learning in autonomous regions minimum quotas for minority
students were being set.
As China enters 19 81, Deng's policies in the area of
nationality affairs seem, from all outward appearances, to be
sincere in motive and accepted by the various nationalities.
Although Deng's sincerity is undoubtedly motivated more by
his concern over the stability, defense, and development of
the border regions than by his compassion for minorities, his
policies have obviously created a welcomed atmosphere of
tranquility for the various nationalities. After all, the
four years since the 1976 overthrow of the gang of four has
been the longest period in 25 years in which they have been
free from any Han-inspired social upheaval.
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When Enders Wimbush, a Soviet Central Asian minorities
expert, visited China in the Summer of 19 80 at the invitation
of the Chinese, he found them to be extremely concerned and
dedicated to resolve their minority problems. After conduct-
ing a talk and discussion at the Central Institute for Nation-
alities in Beijing he was invited to repeat the presentation
at a similar institute in Urumqi. His topic was on Soviet
policies towards and problems with their Central Asian
minorities.
During his visit, Wimbush also noted that there was a drive
to rehabilitate old university professors — nationalities
experts — and that they were being directed to train a new
generation of experts. He also learned that propaganda broad-
casters designated for work in Xinjiang were being segregated
from the general propagandist departments in Beijing for
specialized training. Overall, Wimbush came away from his
trip with the feeling that Beijing was launching a heightened
effort at resolving China's nationalities 1 problems and that
69the Soviet move into Afghanistan was assisting that effort.
From a minorities perspective, Galen Rowell, a noted
adventurer/nature photographer recently returned from climbing
Xinjiang's Muztagata peak, found Kirgiz herdsmen to be con-
tent with their way of life and pleased at social/economic
results of the new policies. He also noted that the Kirgiz
tended state animals along with their own and were able to
move about on grazing land with their extended families
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intact — a far cry from conditions reported by Moseley
some years earlier.
Of course, these reports are not meant to imply that
China's minority problems are over — far from it. They do,
however, reflect the fact that the Han are making progress
towards these problems and that the minorities are gaining
from it and, therefore, finding Han presence more palatable.
Old animosities die hard. For years to come the hatred and
distrust which has been nurtured for centuries will remain
just below the surface awaiting provocation. It will take a
generation or two of regional stability and mutual respect to
overcome these ingrained feelings. One thing that Deng has
working for him, however, is that with a hostile Soviet Union
just across the border, the minorities need the Han almost as
much as the Han need the minorities.
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IV. XINJIANG'S RESOURCE CONTRIBUTION
It is to the Northwest - remote, severely inhospitable,
thinly populated (less than 7 percent of the total) , un-
industrialized (less than 5 percent of gross industrial
output) and still only tenuously linked to the rest of
the country - where the Chinese will have to turn for
their future fuel needs. . .otherwise it. . .will. . .be ex-
tremely difficult to keep China's energy consumption
on its fast, and much needed exponential rise. 7 ^-
When one speaks of Xinjiang's strategic resources one has
to address the matter in terms of potential and of future
prospects. Xinjiang today is to the Chinese what the Western
Territories were to the United States in the mid to late 1800s
vast and rugged, full of potential and promise, and no less
strategically important.
Containing over one- sixth of China's total landmass it
can be said that far more remains unknown than its currently
known about what this land possesses in terms of resources.
Over the years two factors have contributed to this lack of
knowledge. First, the Han Chinese have, until recently,
found resources in sufficient quantity in the east to sat-
isfy their industrial needs. Secondly, Xinjiang's remoteness
and China's poor transportation network have precluded any
major resource exploitation in the region from serious con-
sideration.
Today, however, a renewed interest in Xinjiang is being
generated as China finds itself caught in a vicious and oft
68

times frustrating cycle of modernization. In order to achieve
its modernization goals the PRC requires petroleum, coal, iron,
and a host of other resources to support industrialization.
In turn, China is in need of expensive foreign technology and
equipment to insure its industries are modern, efficient and
capable of meeting the demands of one billion people. To pay
for these imports China has begun exporting its mineral wealth
which has consequently generated increased demands for still
greater efficiency in the discovery and development techniques
of the resource extraction industries which are now burdened
by both domestic and foreign demands.
In this light Xinjiang's resources which have been rela-
tively neglected take on a greater importance. This section
will examine three major energy resources - petroleum, coal,
and hydroelectric - China's "energy triad." Each will first
be discussed in terms of its development - current and future -
within China's overall energy picture (see Figure 4.1). And
secondly, an analysis of Xinjiang's potential contribution of
each will be made. Petroleum, because of its impact on China's
present-day energy position, will receive the bulk of attention,
Before proceeding a caveat should be stated regarding the
accuracy of reserve estimates in China. For both political
and military reasons Beijing has been fairly secretive about
the location and size of its strategic resources. Over the
years, data has been published at erratic intervals and is
often propagandistically inflated. Many times when statistics
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DISTRIBUTION OF FUELS, POWER, MINERALS AND METALS
^hannhai
Oil Basin
',; Major Coal Mine
* Thermal Power Station
® Hydroelectric Power Station
Transmission Line
q Mineral or Metal Deposit Area
^ Coal Deposits (near surface)
C] Coal Deposits (deeply buried)
Figure 4.1
Source: Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict
Ahead (New York, New York: Columbia University Press,
1977) and DuPre Jones, ed. , China U.S. Policy Since
1944 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,
Inc., 1980) p. 370.
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are released they are published as percentages of preceeding
year totals which may or may not have been made public. West-
ern experts have often had to estimate production and reserve
figures for several years running based on their own appraisals
of predicted growth rates. For Xinjiang, reserve statistics
have been even more of a problem since the Chinese themselves
have not been completely aware of what resources are present
and in what quantity.
Fortunately, this is rapidly changing as both the Chinese
become more involved in Xinjiang and as foreign personnel
participate more in the exploration and development of China's
resources.
A. PETROLEUM
Of the three energy sources petroleum has received the
most notoriety though it has been fraught with vicissitudes
in reserve estimates. Statements such as those that follow
have typified the industry in recent years:
"Prospects are that exports can reach 50 million tons
in the early 19 80s and 100 million tons by 19 85."
- K.P.Wang - writing for Bureau of Mines, U.S. Dept. of
the Interior, 1975.
"There just isn't as much [oil] as we thought there was."
- Kiyokawa Yuji - Japanese Commercial Consul, San
Francisco, 1980.
"China's biggest problem is that even the Chinese are
unsure of what they have in the way of oil."
- Jonathan Pollack - China specialist, RAND Corp., 1981.
China's rise to major oil producer status has been a
recent phenomenon with serious production having only begun
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since the 1960s. Prior to that time PRC petroleum needs were
satisfied by Soviet imports. Reflective of China's latecomer
status in the petroleum business is the fact that until the
mid-1970s coal consumption was the emphasized industrial fuel
with liquid petroleum providing for the needs of basically
transportation and agriculture.
In these formative years China's domestic production was
limited to oil fields in western China - namely, Yumen and
Dushanzi (Tu-shan-tzu) in Gansu and Xinjiang respectively.
Both fields were developed with Soviet technology and equip-
ment in the 19 30s. When the two large fields of Daqing (Ta-
ching) and Shengli first came into production in the east in
1960 and 19 62, China's total petroleum production amounted
72to less than 6 million tons.
Daqing and Shengli, however, heightened Beijing's hopes
of becoming self-sufficient and marked the real beginning of
China's petroleum industry. Because of the enormity of these
field's potential reserves and the closeness of their location
to China's industrial heartland, work in the western fields
came to a virtual standstill as skilled labor was moved east
to work the more lucrative and promising fields.
Unfortunately, 19 60 was also the year Moscow withdrew
its technicians from the PRC including those involved in the
budding petroleum industry. With them went years of experi-
ence, technology and equipment - a definite setback for
Beijing's drive toward petroleum self-sufficiency.
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Never one to let a small thing such as a lack of tech-
nology impede progress, and a firm believer in the ability of
sheer manpower to overcome all odds, Mao Zedong pressed ahead
and "learn from Ta-ching" became a symbol of industrial
achievement through self-reliance. Although it took five
years to bring Daqing to an annual output of 11,000 bd
(barrels per day) , China was on its way to becoming a major
oil producer. In 19 67, the Dagang oilfield in Hopeh Province
came into production and together Daqing and Shengli became
known as the "Big Three." By 1975, the "Big Three" were
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accounting for 80 percent of China's petroleum output.
With the Western World scrambling for alternative sources
in the wake of the 1973-74 Middle East oil crises and tighter
supplies conducive to higher prices, Beijing intensi-
fied its petroleum search with renewed fervor. With Japanese
technological assistance in the main, China started to shift
its emphasis from onshore to offshore.
Preliminary geological reports dating back to the 19 50s
indicated that China's continental shelf contained oil basins
in the East China Sea and those which extended from onshore
74in the northeast into the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea. In
19 68, a United Nation's geophysical survey had concluded that
the, "Continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one
ii 75
of the most prolific oil and gas reservoirs in the world.'
Because of its shallow depth, proximity to both port
facilities and domestic industrial consumers, and the extent
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of previous geological research conducted in the gulf, the
Bohai was the most logical starting point for China's off-
shore effort.
By 1972, Beijing already had at least five and possibly
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as many as eight offshore rigs in use in the Bohai. These
rigs were initially fixed platforms in the shallowest water.
As the search for oil extended to deeper waters China found
drilling requirements increasing as well. While maintaining
the image of self-reliance Beijing found several oil depen-
dent nations willing to covertly supply technology through
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rig plans and models. Indigenously produced drilling rigs
and platforms with striking resemblance to foreign equipment
78began to make their appearance off the China coast. With
the normalization of relations with Japan that same year,
Beijing openly negotiated for at least one foreign "jackup"
* 79
rig through Tokyo channels.
Utilizing its own fleet of oceanographic ships and seis-
mological expertise, and Japanese technology China began
probing the depths along its entire continental shelf. From
these geological probes came exhuberant reports of massive
offshore reserves from both the Chinese and Japanese which
were later found to be overly optimistic. Beijing's
*
Jackup rigs are towed to location where their legs are
extended to contact the sea floor. The platform is then
jacked up above the surface. The rig itself supports storage




exaggerations emanated from their desire to lure Japan away
from lucrative joint ventures in Siberia and Sakhalin being
offered by the Soviets. The Japanese, on the other hand, were
inflating reserve estimates in an attempt to improve their
bargaining position vis a vis OPEC and Western suppliers.
This, coupled with the Western World's anxious desire to culti-
vate new petroleum sources, resulted in China being deluged
by major oil company's offers of assistance in hopes of get-
ting their feet in the door of this unfolding drama of oil
discovery.
In pursuing their "learn from Ta-ching" spirit, the
Chinese selectively held the Western majors at bay while
allowing in Japanese and French assistance. They carefully
shopped abroad for drilling technology and equipment, pur-
chasing only that which could not be produced indigenously.
By 1977, the Chinese had ten drilling rigs in operation off
their coast including those locally produced or constructed
in Japan or Singapore. They ranged in complexity from simple
barges to catamarans and jackups. Additionally, Beijing had
contracted out to Norway to build a semisubmersible rig that
80
was capable of deep water operations.
In the flush of success at finding new fields China be-
gan to convert many of its factories and power stations from
coal to oil consumers. As well, Beijing was confident enough
to embark upon its ambitious Fifth Five-Year Plan (19 76-19 80)
and invest heavily in imported equipment and technology. Oil
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exports began to expand as China shipped one million tons of
crude to Japan in 19 73, 4 million tons in 19 74 and 8 million
tons in 1975. Projections for oil exports to Japan by 19 80
8
1
were set at 25 million tons.
However, by the mid-19 70s, many Western observers who had
been skeptics from the outset began to openly question Chinese
estimates and projections. In 1975 the Central Intelligence
Agency published a study in which China's potential as a
major exporter of oil was seriously questioned. Its conclu-
sions were, first, if the PRC maintained an 18 percent annual
increase in the growth of its petroleum industry it would have
to do so at an enormous expense to other sectors such as agri-
culture and industry. And secondly, China, unlike the mideast
OPEC countries had a burgeoning population which in itself
could absorb much of its "excess" petroleum. And lastly, even
if China could sustain its current growth rate of 18 percent
and hold down domestic consumption, by 19 85 it would be in a
position to export only one-tenth of the oil exported by OPEC
in 1974.
This is hardly in keeping with the image of a country
whose potential oil reserves have been compared with
those of the entire Middle East. In fact, it under-
scores just how inapt these comparisons really are. 2
In 1978, Fred Hershede and Mihssen Kadhim published an
article which projected 19 80 and 19 85 petroleum exports to
be 23 and 31 million tons respectively. They concluded, as
did the CIA study, that a massive infusion of investment
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capital into petroleum which would be required to maintain
substantial growth would decelerate growth in agriculture and
8 3industry.
That same year, Randall W. Hardy in his monograph, China 1 s
Oil Future: A Case of Modest Expectations , discussed another
potential limiting factor to China's oil production - that of
geology.
With few exceptions, most of China's potential oil
areas are in continental lacustrine basins. In eastern
China these basins are characterized by a large number
of highly fractured possible stratigraphic traps... The
principle result of such a geological setting is great
variability in reservoir distribution and in porosity
and permeability within each basin. Rather than large
reservoirs which are easily located and exploited, Ta-
ching, Sheng-li, and Ta-kang all appear to have oil in
an unpredictable series of smaller pockets at various
depths. 84
Hardy's thesis was not that China was wanting for oil,
but rather, because of the geological formations in which
Chinese oil is currently found, future exploration for oil
would have to be intensely conducted over vast onshore and
offshore locations, and at varying depths which require in-
creasingly more sophisticated equipment and technology. This
he translated into an expensive venture resulting in oilfields
with many low-volume wells extracting widely dispensed pockets
of oil. He went a step further than the previous studies by
concluding that Beijing had neither the technology nor the
capital required for such a venture.
Despite pessimistic reports, China pressed on with its
efforts. By 19 79 's end, China's fleet of rigs had been
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expanded to twenty including those under construction. 85
Additionally, the Bohai Gulf and Yellow Sea were apportioned
between Japanese, French and British consortiums under the
guidelines set forth in "risk contracts." These Chinese con-
tracts called for foreign contractors to share in the cost in
exploration and development in return for a share of the
eventual output of oil.
The Japanese, confident of China's oil prospects, signed
an agreement in February 19 78, which called for the purchase
of 9.5 million tons of Chinese crude oil in 19 81 and 15
million tons in 1982. 86
Despite surface appearances, China's oil boom had begun
to show signs of serious problems - some subtle and others
not so subtle. Since 1972, production increase percentages
for Daqing had, with the exception of 19 74, been declining.
The Chinese also acknowledged problems with the Shengli fields:
[Drilling] ... is troublesome, with formations suddenly
soft and suddenly hard. Small reservoirs are spread
out in unpredictable patterns in the widely scattered
active areas. Underground permeability and pressure
conditions vary. In production, some reservoirs are
pumped, some water-injected, and some are fractured
or acidized to promote a flow of oil through the re-
servoir rock. The field's management and personnel
reportedly are still overwhelmed by the problems
related to inconsistency in characteristics of oil
produced and water and salt removal. 8 ^
Dagang, last of the "big three" fields, is situated but 50
kilometers from Shengli and believed to have geological forma-
tions similar if not more fractured than Shegli. Moreover,
geologists estimate the Bohai to be an extension of the Shengli
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and Dagang basins and, therefore, oil production there is
likely to be plagued with many of the problems associated
with its onshore counterparts.
Compounding matters was the fact that as China extended
its search beyond the shallow depths of the Bohai and into
more promising, but deeper waters of the East China Sea and
Gulf of Tonkin the cost of drilling began to skyrocket due
to the increased sophistication and complexity of required
equipment. As an example, a semisubmersible drilling platform
which is more suited to the greater depths involved and can
withstand the typhoon-prone weather of these regions rents
for $30,000 per day or, if purchased, can cost in the neigh-
88borhood of $50-80 million. A less complex jackup rig cost
at least $20-50 million to construct. These costs merely
reflect the price of the basic equipment required in the
drilling of test wells. China Business Review recently esti-
mated that China's offshore fields could run between $500
89
million and $3 billion to develop. These figures include
the price for daily supply/support for rig personnel, hiring
foreign technicians to provide technological assistance for
the increased sophistication of deepwater equipment and
methods, plus the purchase of production platforms (which
require a three-year lead time to construct) , and installa-
tion pipeline which range in cost from $375,000 to $850,000




Almost symbolic of Beijing's mounting petroleum troubles
the Japanese-built jackup rig, Bohai II, capsized and sank
during a storm in November 1979, while being moved to a new
drilling site. In true Deng style of "seek truths from facts,"
the incident became a national campaign - "Learn from Bohai
II." In the court hearing which followed it was brought out
that not only had there been negligence involved, but the
whole petroleum industry was lacking in technical and manage-
rial expertise. Management was blamed for cutting corners
and ignoring safety standards. As a result of the hearings
90the Minister of Petroleum, Song Zhenming, was fired.
Contributing to China's petroleum development woes has
been the fact that just as the industry began to invest heavi-
ly in offshore exploration and production China's economic
reins were simultaneously pulled back by Deng. By 19 78,
China's modernization effort had become plagued by major
imbalances in various industrial sectors. As heavy industry
attempted to meet goals set by the certain subsectors including
petroleum, coal, electric power, transportation, building
and a number of raw materials failed to keep pace. The re-
sult was an acute shortage of fuel, power and some key raw
materials throughout industry accompanied by transportation
bottlenecks. causing factory closures and underutilization
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of capacity. China had discovered that during years of
emphasis on heavy industrial development scant attention had
been paid to the light industrial sector which was now
80

proving incapable of providing an adequate infrastructure to
support the modernization effort.
It became apparent that China's economy was adrift in a
sea of modernization (including the petroleum industry) . The
"Four Modernization" (agriculture, industry, national defense,
science and technology) goals were proving over ambitious,
especially in regard to payment for and absorbtion of the
projected volume of technologically sophisticated imports.
Consequently, the Ten-Year Plan was scaled down and attention
focused on a comparatively short transitional period (19 78-
80) called the period of "Readjustment, Restructuring, and
Consolidation.
"
The aim of this readjustment period has been threefold:
correction of industrial imbalances, the restructuring of the
country's overall economic planning, and elimination of ineffi-
ciency in the management of enterprises. A major result of
this period has been the reevaluation, cutback and cancella-
tion of many joint projects with foreign governments. The
Japanese, who have invested the heaviest in China's moderniza-
tion have been hit the hardest with billions of dollars in
projects and contracts having been trimmed or scrapped al-
together by Beijing.
Indicative of both economic slowdown and problems within
the petroleum industry itself was Beijing's announcement to
Japan in September 1980, that China would not be able to
fulfill its oil export commitment as outlined in the February
81

19 78, agreement. The announcement by Zhao Ziyang stated that
although coal exports commitments would be met, petroleum
exports would be reduced from 9.5 to 8.3 million tons in 19 81
and from 15 to 8.3 million tons in 19 82. The reasons given
were that initial production targets were far from attainable
and that China's crude oil production was leveling off and
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would possibly decline despite a rise in domestic demand.
In view of the major role Japan has, until now, played in
China's modernization, and the resultant strain these cancel-
lations and cutbacks have imposed upon their relations it is
highly doubtful Beijing would arbitrarily restrain oil exports
if the oil was available to ship. Those export dollars are
a vital part of China's balance of payments with Japan who
has thus far been its most generous foreign "bankroller ,
"
supplying enormous loans, and technology and equipment
transfers.
China is thus faced with a dilemma of major proportions
- it needs an increasingly larger supply of oil for both
domestic industrial expansion and to pay for foreign imports
at the very time the oil industry is encountering difficulty
in expanding output. Exacerbating the situation is Beijing's
phobic aversion to incurring large balance of payments de-
ficits. In essence, they are unable to meet both domestic
and foreign demands with existing production, and with a




In response to this dilemma Beijing has done three things.
First, with regard to offshore development, China has seem-
ingly compromised and will selectively open contract bids to
foreign contractors for the development of oil fields in the
Yellow and South China seas. At present, sixteen companies
have signed agreements with China for geophysical surveying
with an additional 30 corporations from nine countries having
already helped underwrite part of the survey costs in return
93for the resultant data.
Secondly, China has taken a long look at its policy of
converting industry from consumers of coal to oil and recent
reports indicate this policy has been reversed. This will
be discussed later in more detail.
The third avenue China has pursued is the renewal of its
onshore search for oil - particularly in its northwest regions
Over the last year and a half the Chinese have been conduct-
ing geological and seismic survey in the northwest with in-
creased vigor. In August 1979, Beijing "invited 20 major
oil companies from eight countries to discuss the explora-
tion and development (through risk contracts) of several
onshore oilfields. These included the Junggar and Tarim
basins in Xinjiang; the Qaidam Basin in Qinghai; Erdos in
the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Inner Mongolia region; the Sichuan
Basin, Guizhou, and Yunnan; northern Jiangsu Province;
94Dagang; and other small fields."
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Two companies - Compagnie Generale de Geophysique (CGG)
of France, and Geosource of Houston - have been selected to
conduct seismic surveys in China's Xinjiang and Qinghai
95provinces. In October of 1980, the Chinese conducted their
own cross sectional survey in the Tarim Basin and concluded
9 6that conditions were good for reserves of petroleum and gas.
1. Return to Xinjiang
Thus, in less than thirty years China's quest for oil
has been full circle. As fields in the east level off in
production growth, and with the escalating cost of further
offshore exploration and production, development of the north-
west reserves is becoming more plausible and enticing. Let
us now examine what Xinjiang potentially has to offer in the
way of petroleum resources.
To begin with, there are three major oil basins lo-
cated within Xinjiang and another in the neighboring province
of Qinghai. Because of its proximity and demographic simi-
larities to Xinjiang it will be included in this study.
a. Junggar Basin
Source of China's first major oil fields, the
Junggar Basin in northern Xinjiang holds two key fields -
the Karamay and the Dushanzi. Because of the outflow of




The Dushanzi field, located at the northern foot
of the Tien Shan, was first developed in 19 38 by Soviet engin-
eers as a joint project between the Chinese Warlord Sheng
Shicai and Moscow. Prior to the opening of the eastern fields
Dushanzi was believed to be the richest single oil field in
97China with recoverable estimated at 850 million tons. All
the same, with 30 wells having been drilled by 19 42 output
remained limited with only 2,500 tons produced that year.
With Soviet assistance the field's output was increased to
an eventual 9 4,500 tons by 19 57 - a meager amount for a field
that had China's oil hopes pinned on it. As the Chinese have
not updated that figure in recent years and because larger
fields were discovered elsewhere, it is probable that
Dushanzi 's output increased little beyond the 19 57 level.
Today, Dushanzi is known more for its two re-
fineries (one of which was constructed with Soviet equipment)
which have a combined capacity of over 2 million tons per
9 8year. In addition, two pipelines were constructed between
19 58 and 19 60 linking the Karamay fields with the refineries.
Having a length of 147 kilometers and diameters of 24 and 16
inches these pipelines are capable of respectively trans-
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ferring 700,000 and 400,000 tons of crude annually.
The Karamay oilfield to which the Dushanzi refin-
eries are linked began official production in 19 57 - again
with the assistance of Soviet engineers. From an initial
two wells producing an estimated 50,000 tons of crude per
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year, this field has grown to an estimated annual output of
over 3 million tons by 19 75.
Sediment thickness of this field was reported by
the Soviets to be 2,000-3,000 meters with reserve estimates
ranging from an initial 100 million tons to a later 350
million tons. The quality of oil reportedly has a low paraf-
fin and sulphur content as well as a low freezing point (an
important factor in pipelining oil across a region known for
its bitter cold weather)
.
In addition to the Karamay-Dushanzi pipeline oil
is transferred via a 300 kilometer pipeline to a railroad in
Urumqi where it is transported by train to refineries in
Lanzhou. At present an additional Karamay-Urumqi pipeline
is under construction which when completed will reportedly
102triple the amount of oil shipped out of the region.
Before Karamay fields can be expanded additional
sources of water will have to be found. The Chinese now
rely on the Manas River to provide water for oilwell injection
unfortunately the Manas has a habit of drying up during
winter months.
Another more resolvable problem seems to be a
lack of technical expertise. In June of 19 80, China's Oil
and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation contracted
with an American drilling company to provide specialized
drilling services and well-control expertise. Utilizing
Chinese equipment the Oklahoma based company will "conduct
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directional drilling in the western part of the Karamay oil-
field to try to clean up three blowouts the Chinese have
104been grappling with for several years."
b. Tarim Basin
To the south of Karamay and across the Tien Shan
lies the Tarim Basin. Occupying more than half of Xinjiang's
land area the Tarim contains one of the largest and harshest
deserts at its core - the Taklimakan. It also contains many
of the same geophysical formations as the Junggar which are
indicative of sizeable petroleum reserves. It is also believed
to be China's most extensive sedimentary rock basin. Because
of its expansiveness , sparse population, and harsh climate
geological surveying has been rather limited. However, what
surveying has been done has resulted in encouraging results.
Three wells have been drilled since 19 77 and "all are high
yield, with high underground pressure and stable output,
producing hundreds of tons of oil and nearly a million cubic
105
meters of natural gas each day." Chinese optimism re-
garding the basin is expressed by the fact they hope to
produce 12 million tons of crude annually from the Tarim.
c. Qaidam Basin
Southeast from the Tarim lies the Qaidam Basin -
another highly promising area for petroleum development.
Although located in Qinghai Province, its main oilfields are




Located in the high altitude of the Tibetan
Plateau, the Qaidam Basin, which the Chinese characterized
as a "sea of oil," has been producing oil since 19 56. By
1962 annual production of the field was 85,000 tons which was
an eightfold increase since first opening.
In 1970, A. A. Meyerhoff, a noted oil geologist
published a study which concluded that on a per-acre basis
Qaidam Basin was the most prolific oil area in China. At
the time, he estimated recoverable oil to be 1.1 billion
barrels. He also reported that 18 moderate-siz:e, large and
giant fields had been discovered and that much of the prom-
10 6ising areas remained to be tested.
By 19 75, the Lenghu area was producing 9 5 percent
of Qaidam* s oil with a goodly portion of output going to
Xizang (Tibet) . Lenghu itself had become a major industrial
center boasting "a gasoline refinery and 150 factories and
mines that produced petroleum and petrochemical products and
107
also cement, iron and steel, and machinery."
From Lenghu petroleum is transported to Yumen
via a 350 kilometer pipeline where it is shipped east by
railroad. There is another pipeline under construction that
will connect the Qaidam Basin with Llasha in Xizang - a dist-
ance of 1,100 kilometers. As there is little industry in
Xizang this pipeline is presumably being built to assure a
reliable source of oil for Sino-Indian border forces. In
the past oil, has been transported by trucks across arduous
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mountain roads which was a costly endeavor with one-third of
the oil being lost to spillage and consumption by the trucks,
d. Turpan Basin
A last area considered to be potentially rich in
oil is the Turpan Basin. Other than preliminary geological
surveys and limited exploratory drilling which has suggested
the presence of substantial oil reserves, little has been
done to develop these reserves. In 19 70, Meyerhoff estimated
10 8Turpan' s ultimate recoverable reserves to be 6.8 million tons.
This would bring Xinjiang's total, including Qaidam, to 373.6












Total for areas 373.6
Source : Figures are drawn from A. A. Meyerhoff, "Develop-
ments in Mainland China, 19 49-68," American
Association of Petroleum Geologists Bulletin
,




Although 373.6 million tons of crude does not
equate to another Persian Gulf one must consider that these
figures, although widely used today, are ten years old and
derived from data which, in some instances, has not been up-
dated since the 19 50s. As modern methods are employed in
China's intensified search for oil these reserve figures are
bound to be revised upwards. For example, based on recent
exploratory drilling and initial production results, Beijing
is hoping to produce 12 million tons of crude annually from
the Tarim Basin which was estimated by Meyerhoff to have a
total of 6.8 million tons of recoverable reserves. This is
not to denegrate his work, it is instead to demonstrate how
little is known about the ultimate size of Xinjiang's reserves
The point is that Xinjiang, based upon what is
known thus far, has sizeable oil resources that can contribute
to China's modernization - either as export to pay for tech-
nology or as fuel for its own industrial fires. It is, how-
ever, going to take investment capital to realize this
potential. As with China's offshore fields sophisticated
survey and drilling techniques, and equipment will be
required to fully exploit the region. As well, existing
transportation methods will have to be updated and vastly
expanded. Transportation bottlenecks are one of the most
critical problems besetting China's resource extraction
industries today and this applies to all industrial sectors,
not just petroleum. For instance in 19 75, China's pipeline
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system totalled just over 5,000 kilometers of installed and
operating pipeline. In comparison the United States installed
10 9
over 26 , 000 kilometers between 19 7 2 and 197 3 alone. This
problem will become especially acute as the Chinese either
by choice or out of necessity turn to Xinjiang to meet its
future energy needs. You can't support industry's voracious
appetite by transporting oil via trucks which will spill and
consume one-third of their cargo. Xinjiang is a long way
from the east.
Additionally, refining capacity will have to be
enlarged to handle the additional crude. At present it is
estimated that China's refining capacity lags production by
at least 20 percent. How much more so if Xinjiang's
reserves are fully exploited?
These are problems which the Deng government is
grappling with and which will have to be worked out during
the period of readjustment. China cannot continue building
industries when, one, they can't provide the energy to run
them and, second, there is no transportation system to dis-
tribute effectively their product.
B . COAL
As petroleum enjoyed its meteoric rise to energy fame,
coal, a resource of giant proportions in China, has taken a
backseat. At one time coal provided over 90 percent of
China's energy needs, but over the past two decades this
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percentage has dropped below 70 percent as petroleum assumed
a greater share of China's energy market. During the 1970s
Beijing, as mentioned earlier, made a major effort to con-
vert its industries from coal consumers to oil users. With
petroleum's rise having reached a plateau, however, the
Chinese have reevaluated this policy and now appear to be
reversing it. Officials who pushed for this conversion are
now being accused of "acting too hastily" and of "putting
their eggs in one basket," thus creating imbalances within
the energy industry. Energy officials are now reexamining
China's most abundant energy resource with an eye to China's
uncertain energy future.
In Zhou Zhiying's article, "The Economy Successes in
19 80, Targets for 19 81," published in December 19 80, he
states:
Technical transformation will center around saving
energy. Preparations will begin next year to renovate
medium and low-voltage generating units which consume
too much coal. Machinery with high energy consumption
will be modernized. We had [sic] gone into large-scale
conversion to oil fuel in recent years without a full
knowledge of our oil resources. Now we are converting
back to coal.m-
1. How Much and What's Been Done So Far ?
China's coal reserves are not known with much cer-
tainty, but all agree they are among the largest in the
world. The spectrum of estimates is extraordinarily wide,
*




ranging from a few hundred billion tons to over 10 trillion
tons. PRC published reports in the late 19 50s referred to
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verified reserves of around 100 billion tons.
The China Business Review recently reported, "China
has verified coal reserves of some 600 billion metric tons
and estimated reserves of some five trillion tons. Raw coal
output in each of the last two years has exceeded 600
million tons, third after the Soviet Union and the United
113States." According to Chinese sources the 19 80 coal pro-
114duction target was met at 60 million tons. Although high
by world standards, 19 80's output was actually a decline
from the years 19 78 and 19 79 which produced 618 and 635 million
tons respectively.
This reduction has not necessarily been due to deple-
tion or lack of technical skills, but instead is probably
reflective of the general economic readjustment period
announced in 19 78. Lowered production targets have been in
line with Deng Xiaoping' s effort to reassess unrealistic
production goals and to bring them in balance with China's
overall economic capabilities. To make up for the slow or
negative growth in coal output, Beijing has aimed to cut
consumption by improving conservation.
Additionally, Beijing plans on gradually increasing
production through the opening of new mines and enlargement
of existing mines. The preponderance of coal mines cur-
rently being exploited is located in the provinces of Shanxi,
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Anhui, Hebi and Henan. Areas of major reserves yet to be
developed are to be found in Huolinhe, Jilin, Junggar, Inner
Mongolia, Yunlin , Sichuan; and four areas in Xinjiang.
2. Xinjiang's Potential
In the case of Xinjiang little has been published
regarding its coal reserves. This of course has been due to
the Chinese previously having little cause to exploit the
regions resources. Up to now there has been more coal than
China can effectively exploit right in the backyards of its
eastern industrial centers. Secondly, Xinjiang has enough
petroleum to power its limited industries without having to
develop its coal resources.
As with petroleum, estimates of coal reserves have
been wide ranging. In 19 58, Chinese sources estimated
* 115
reserves in the northwest to be 280.7 billion tons. In
December 1979, it was announced that Xinjiang had known coal
reserves of 4.46 billion tons of fine quality steam coal
including 500 million tons of coking coal. In mid 19 80
Chinese sources published a report which placed Xinjiang's
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recoverable reserves at 15 billion tons.
A further statement which graphically told of
Xinjiang's abundance of accessible reserves appeared in a
China Reconstructs article on January, 19 81:
*





[Urumqi] .. .actually rests on dozens of seams of coal -
they are so difficult to avoid that the Kunlun Hotel
was built right over one.H^
In 1979 Jack Chen, author of The Sinking Story , wrote
that at present there are modern coal mines in operation in
119Urumqi and Yining.
Though not in the giant quantities found in Hubei,
there are clearly ample reserves of readily accessible coal
in Xinjiang. The importance of this fact is not that the
region should or even could become a major exporter of coal.
Without even leaving Xinjiang, its coal could play a major
part in China's modernization.
By developing and retaining its coal, Xinjiang would
be able to supply its own industrial needs for many decades
into the future. In turn, its petroleum would be freed for
shipment east for either domestic consumption or export.
Because of the region's projected low energy requirements
its coal could concurrently be developed to provide thermo-
electrical power for China Proper. This could be accomplished
through the construction of "pit-head power plants." This
method removes the problem of transportation in that thermo-
electric generators are built at the site of the coal mines.
From there electricity would be transferred east via power
lines - much less expensive proposition than constructing
additional rail facilities. This plan appears to be gaining




...A plan has been worked out to turn coal-rich pro-
vinces and autonomous regions gradually into power-
supplying centers, each with one or more pit-head
power plants. ^O
C . HYDROELECTRICITY
The last leg of our energy triad to be discussed is hydro-
electric power. Although not a strategic resource in the
sense that it can impact directly on foreign markets, be used
as a foreign policy tool or measured as mineral wealth; it
none- the- less is a potential that when harnessed can contri-
bute greatly to a nation's industrialization, enhance GNP
growth (i.e. world economic stature), and free other more
exportable energy resources.
China is acutely aware of its hydroelectric potential
which, at 370 million kilowatts recoverable, is ranked second
to none by world standards. During the last decade Beijing
invested heavily in hydropower, particularly in the area of
small generating facilities. As of April 1979, 88,000 of
these plants provided rural areas with a total of 5,380 mega-
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watts of generating capacity. Accounting for one-third
of total hydro generation, these hydros provide not only
power for local industries, as well as irrigation and drain-
age, food and fodder processing and timber sawing, small
hydro reservoirs regulate water supplies, help prevent floods,
and are used to breed fish and other aquatic products.
The decade of the 1980s the emphasis, however, will shift
more toward medium and large facilities. Demonstrative of
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this is the Gezhouba hydroelectric project being built at
Gezhouba, near Yichang (Hubei Province) at the mouth of the
Yangzi Gorges.
There, 30,000 workers are building China's biggest hydro
project, a scheme that will cost $2.3 billion and even-
tually produce 14 billion kwh of electricity a year.
It is to be completed in 1986 after 16 years of effort.
The importance of the Gezhouba is that it is a pilot
project, a preamble to the bigger Three Gorges scheme
40 kilometers farther up the Yangzi. It is the first
of China's new great walls. 122
The Three Gorges project when completed will generate
111 billion kwh (or 40 percent of China's 1979 hydroelectric
requirements) and will have cost an estimated $6.38 billion
to complete. As large as this project is it represents just
a portion of in-progress or proposed hydro facilities. At
present there are 14 major projects under construction and
123
an additional 13 in the development and planning stage.
Yet, despite China's investment in hydroelectric power
there is still a major shortage of electrical power in the
industrial centers. As with other infrastructural sectors
hydroelectric power has failed to keep pace with heavy in-
dustry. In recent years there have been reports of factories
running at reduced capacity and of blackouts and brownouts
becoming more commonplace. According to some experts this
problem is likely to worsen and persist until the late 19 80s
when new hydro facilities become operable.
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1. Xinjiang's Hydroelectric Contribution
Once again, when Xinjiang's contribution to China's
hydroelectric resources are discussed one must speak in terms
of potential. Heretofore there has not been the industrial
development to justify large-scale hydro development. At
present there is but one major hydroelectric plant in opera-
tion in Xinjiang. It is the Korla station located on the
Konqi River just 15 kilometers north of the budding industrial
center of Korla. With a planned 35,000 kw capacity it supplies
124
electricity to Korla and the Tarim Basin.
The next sizeable hydro plant is the Yutian plant
which went into operation in November 19 80. Located on the
Keriya River in the southermost region of the Tarim Basin
this plant has a 1,250 kw capacity which is expected to be
125increased to 3,150 kw with additional generators. The
remainder of Xinjiang's hydro plants are smaller in size,
supplying power to individual small factories and rural areas
for agricultural electrification.
Despite the limited scope of these facilities Xinjiang
is not wanting in hydroelectric potential. Composed of two
major drainage basins - the Junggar and the Tarim - the
region is inundated with hundreds of small to large streams
and rivers which have their headwaters in the towering
mountain ranges that both surround and bisect Xinjiang. From
the Kunlun flows the Qaraqan, the Keriya, and Karakax; from
the Karakorums, the Yarkant/Tarim - China's longest inland
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river; from the Pamirs, the Kaxgar; from the Tian Shan, the
Sino-Soviet Yili, and the Manas; and so it goes, right on
around the northernmost boundaries with many smaller rivers
interspersed amongst the larger.
With more than a few of these hydroelectric sources
there are problems associated with harnessing due to climatic
changes. In winter some of the rivers which have as their
source the snow melts of higher elevations are dry due to the
extremely hot temperatures of the deserts which seemingly
absorb all moisture. With still others, rushing water flows
down from the higher elevations and disappears beneath the
piedmont gravel of lower plateau areas. This is not to say
that these problems are irresolvable, but rather that Xinjiang
has many hydro sources, some of which have problems that need
to be worked out such as reservoir building to ensure a
constant flow of water.
In a study published in 19 63, it was estimated that
the northwest held over 9 percent of China's hydro energy
126potential. Using the 370 million kw figure, that equates
to over 34 million kw of energy. Put another way, the north-
west could theoretically generate twice the electricity of
the Gezhouba and Three Gorges projects combined.
D
. SUMMARY
In summary, the Chinese are at an energy crossroad enroute
to their goal of modernization. With oilfield production
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growth leveling off in the east and offshore deepwater drill-
ling becoming cost prohibitive a decision is going to have
to be made as to how China will secure its future needs.
Will it increase investment in offshore development or switch
to the northwest?
The most probable course will be an increase of invest-
ment in both areas. China will soon reach the point where
there is no choice - Beijing will have to exploit both
regions to relieve its growing energy needs. By bringing
Xinjiang's resources "on line" in conjunction with energy
projects in China Proper the Chinese will greatly enhance
their industrial growth capacity. As mentioned previously,
Xinjiang in itself offers several alternatives for energy
development. Hydro power can be expanded to supply regional
industrial growth thereby freeing coal and oil for use in
the east; pit-head power stations can be built which generate
electrical power that can be transferred to industrial centers;
or oilfields can be further exploited for export eastward
and/or abroad. The Chinese naturally would not be limited
to one or the other option as they could be developed in any
of several effective combinations.
Regardless of what avenue China takes, Xinjiang's wealth
of resources can no longer be ignored. At one time it was
said they were being reserved for use in the future. Because
of events outlined in this section that future seems to have
arrived. A major thrust of Beijing's recent energy strategy
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as stated by Vice Premier Yu Qiuli is in effect that China
will have to tap all available resources to meet its energy
demands. Or as quoted in the introduction: "It is to the
Northwest. . .where the Chinese will have to turn for their




V. THE DEFENSE OF XINJIANG
Now that an examination has been made of Xinjiang's con-
tribution to China's modernization effort, attention must be
focused on Xinjiang's main detractor - that of defense. In
turn, Xinjiang's defense capabilities must be viewed in con-
text with China's overall strategic posture in order to assess
Beijing's ability to protect the region from both outside
interference and internal disruption. Without the capability
to maintain regional stability and positive control, the
development of Xinjiang's resources could prove to be a
risky endeavor - one in which much needed foreign investors
have already voiced a concern over.
In general, China's military modernization has proceeded
along the same lines as the Four Modernizations - a boom
period with emphasis on foreign imports (arms transfers in
the case of defense) followed by a retrenchment that has been
marked by a backing away from foreign technology contracts.
Because of this, various defense vulnerabilities have emerged
or have been perpetuated which impact upon regional defense
in Xinjiang. In this section developments in defense modern-
ization will be looked at from 19 76 through 19 80; current
policies and inherent vulnerabilities pointed out; and a
possible alternative defense strategy for Xinjiang put forth.
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A. THE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS AND DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW
When the new leadership took power in 19 76, Chinese mili-
tary planners moved quickly in the pragmatic climate to
implement a broadly based program to modernize the military
machine-building industries. During this period and up to
19 78, the Chinese also began the expansion of more than 50
major military industrial facilities and made sweeping changes
in the military, scientific and technological structures
themselves.
Concurrently, Beijing launched a massive program to study
the acquisition of foreign military technology and equipment.
From 1976 to mid- 1979 more than 4,500 military, technical, and
industrial representatives were dispatched from or travelled
to China to discuss possible Chinese acquisition of Western
military equipment and manufacturing know-how. These dele-
gations discussed and began negotiations on hundreds of items
ranging from basic technology such as special metal processing
equipment, to major weapon systems including fighter aircraft
and missiles.
As these missions acquainted themselves with the modern
world, two things quickly became apparent. First, just how
far behind China was in weapons technology and, second, modern
technology was not to be had cheaply. Countries such as
France, Great Britain, West Germany and Sweden which had
large sums invested in weapon's research and development
were not about to "give away" technology to a potential
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market rival. Simultaneously, as Western arms exporters came
to realize the enormity of costs involved in modernizing a
3.4 million man army with off-the-shelf weapons and China's
lack of and unwillingness to borrow the requisite hard cur-
rency, their illusions of another Iranian or Saudi arms
market began to dim.
Chinese hopes of coproduction and licensed manufacturing
agreements also faded as it became apparent that China did
not possess the technological industrial base or skilled labor
force to support such operations. Although capable of pro-
ducing most materials and basic types of machinery required
to support current production efforts, China's machine-
building industry was (and still is) seriously deficient in
its capacity to manufacture superalloys, electrical steels,
electronic components, chemical equipment, machine tools and
specialized industrial machinery needed for high technology
production.
To compound matters, and in addition to the industrial
imbalances discussed earlier, there was found to exist a
serious lack of coordination between civilian and military
purchases abroad. As a result, there was duplication in the
importation of both technology and hardware - something which
China, short of hard currency, could ill afford.
In conjunction with the "readjustment" period and to
ensure the success of its goals, Deng Xiaoping brought to
the forefront two previously purged economic leaders. Yao
10 4

Yilin, who formerly served as vice minister of trade (19 49-
52) , vice minister of commerce (1952-58) , and minister of
commerce (1960-67) , was reappointed minister of commerce in
August 19 78. In July 1979, he was named a vice premier and
placed on the powerful State Financial and Economic Commission,
127the overseer of China's modernization effort. Chen Yun,
who was responsible for much of the success of China's First
Five-Year Plan (19 53-57) , and formerly elected to the standing
committee of the Politburo, was named minister in charge of
the State Financial and Economic Commission, "a position that
evidently put him in sole charge of China's modernization
and marked him as the second most powerful man in the state
128government, behind Deng Xiaoping."
Both men had previously been purged for their opposition
to radical campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and their
pro "expert" stance in the "red vs. expert" controversy over
the modernization of defense. Thus, their appointment to
high positions was as much a part of Deng's political maneu-
vering as it was an effort to redirect China's economy.
With Chen at the helm, the " four modernizations" began
to take a more circumspective tack which, in turn, impacted
on defense modernization and arms transfer negotiations.
The most conspicuous result was that defense slipped from
129third to last in the priority of the four modernizations.
As well, the level of military equipment delegations sent
abroad began a rapidly decline in 19 79.
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Behind these obvious changes a subtle, but major economic
transformation took place. Chen and Yao moved to establish
coordinated civilian control over China's economy which in-
cluded the rehabilitation and appointment of qualified
managers and planners who had, in the past, been branded
"capitalist roaders." Communists were now sought for their
expertise rather than their political learnings.
In the Ministries of Machine Industries (MMI) which con-
trol most military industrial output, civilians were named




THE MINISTRIES OF MACHINE INDUSTRIES
Ministry Rnpnusdiiiily
Year Assumed
Piescut Responsibility Current Minister! Fonnrr Ministers
Second Atomic Energy Sept. I960 Liu Wei (Brig-Gen) Song IU'iU|iong (Ll-Ceti)
Liu Jic
Liu \iiio
Third Aircraft ind Aerodynamic Mindex 1963-65* Lu Dong Zhang Liangui
Sun Zhi^uan
Li Qitai (AF Maj-Gcn)
Fourth Electronics May 1963 Qian Min Wang 7hcng (Li On)
Fifth Ordnance
(conventional weapons, etc)
Sept. 1963 Zliaug /lien CJiu Zliuangthrng (Lt Gen)
Li Chcngfang (Cen)
Sixth Shipbuilding Sept. 1963 Cliai Shufan Fang Q.iang (V-Adni)
Dian Jiang
Scscnth lUIIUuc Missile* Jan. 1965 /heng Tianxiang Wang iiiiit.'/iuiig (AF LtCen)
Wang Yang (<.oi)
Song Keuqiong (l.t-Cen)
Eighth (.ice text) Sept. 1979 7hiao Ruovu (None)
•Thud MMI waa responsible fur all military industry (li-»» uiiik.ii) in I'NaJ ITM lU-twcin September PHit and Vi.i.irilnr ''*>'< tartout
product lines were assigned to the new Fourth through Seventh MM Is. leaving ilie Third MMI icsponsible only fur ami aft
Source: Harlan Jencks , "Chinese Defense Modernization,"
Asian Survey
,
October 19 80, p. 390.
This move reaffirmed Deng's desire to assert civilian
control over the military and China's plan to eliminate the
10 6

competitiveness which had produced redundancy and waste in
both foreign purchases and domestic production.
The overall emphasis of industrial production was shifted
from heavy to light industry in an effort to, one, develop
the requisite infrastructure that China lacked for its mod-
ernization (i.e. roadways, rail system, port facilities and
light machinery) and, second, to satisfy the growing consumer
demands of its burgeoning population (i.e. housing, radios,
refrigerators, etc.). Towards this end defense industries
were called upon to assist through the production of civilian
goods at PLA factories.
In the wake of this economic readjustment arms negotia-
tions slowed to a snail's pace with little if any hardware
being bought or sold. The Chinese seemingly adopted the
Japanese Meiji Restoration technique of buying as little and
borrowing as much foreign technology as possible. The offi-
cial party line as editorialized in RENMIN RIBAO demonstrates
this point:
We must persist in the principle of importing fewer
complete sets of equipment and importing more technology.
Duplication in the importing of complete sets of equip-
ment is very harmful for the development of domestic
machine manufacturing as well as for ridding ourselves
from dependence on foreign technology. Equipment that
can be manufactured in cooperation with foreign buisiness-
men, should be strictly controlled. 130
This statement is not an isolated one and it does not
pertain to civilian modernization alone. It is part and
parcel of a broad spectrum of change through which China is
10 7

attempting to modernize. Unfortunately, national defense,
a major target of that change has, in turn, become its victim.
What began as a massive drive to modernize China's war machine
and acquire superpower status through foreign arms and tech-
nology transfers has now been suspended in limbo with the PLA
remaining equipped with outdated and outmoded weapons.
B. CURRENT STRATEGIES AND VULNERABILITIES
While this period of readjustment may prove beneficial
to the formation of a solid base for modernization in the long
run, it has done little to enhance China's defensive capa-
bilities in the interim. As Beijing needs freedom from both
internal dissension and foreign intervention in order to
modernize it has become caught in yet another "Catch-22."
How can China subordinate military development while at the
same time maintaining a viable deterrence?
Deng's response to the situation has been to borrow time
for modernization by creating a defense strategy that is
sustained by three broad assumptions. These assumptions are:
1) the Soviet Union is and will remain militarily over ex-
tended; 2) diplomatic ties with the West will provide a
counter-balance to Soviet hegemony and; 3) the "luring deep"
concept of People's War is still a viable defense tactic.
While Deng's overall strategy may be valid at present,
the assumptions are, however, subject to change in the case
of the first and questionable in the latter two.
10 8

To begin with, the Soviet Union which has 10 divisions
in Afghanistan, 44-46 divisions along the northern boundary
of China and 500,000 troops situated around Poland, is fairly
well extended. This, however, is not a static situation.
Moscow has achieved a great deal of flexibility in the deploy-
ment of its highly mobile forces and is quite capable of
redeploying them in response to strategic opportunities.
There is no rule that states that Soviet forces have to re-
main in Afghanistan or anywhere else if larger gains are to
be had elsewhere at cheaper costs. Although this is a sim-
plistic statement of Soviet force deployment, the point is
obvious - Beijing cannot count on Moscow's strategic posture
today for the security it will need tomorrow.
The second assumption - ties with the West will counter-
balance Soviet hegemonism - is questionable at best. Over
the past few years the Chinese have placed a great deal of
emphasis on the insertion of "anti-hegemony" clauses in their
agreements and communiques with other nations. The United
States signed one in 1972 as did the Japanese in 1978.
Although part of China's diplomatic encirclement of the Soviet
Union one has to question whether or not these clauses are
more than rhetorical grist for cocktail toasts and grease for
the skids of trade. Granted, it is in our best interest to
be diplomatically allied against Soviet aggression, but how
bound would the United States be if Moscow decided to teach
China a lesson through a limited intervention?
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Understandably, there would be worldwide outrage and
response to a Soviet preemptive nuclear strike or massive
conventional invasion of China's industrial heartland. But,
what if they instead, seized a piece of the Gobi Desert or
the Junggar Basin? Would other nations be so willing to risk
a military confrontation? While at present an intervention
of this sort would not be so physically damaging as it would
prove psychologically humilating, it could have the same
result of disrupting China's modernization effort and creating
internal dissention and chaos from which China might not
recover.
The last assumption - that China can be defended by a
"luring deep" concept of defense - is the weakest of all.
China's luring deep strategy has its roots in the strategy
China used against the Japanese. As expoused by Mao Zedong,
luring deep is a tactic whereby a militarily superior enemy
is lured deep into one's own territory, cut off from supplies
131
and communications, then annihilated by guerrilla forces.
It is predicated on an active defense and utilization of
China's expansive geography to overextend the enemy. The
basic condition of military inferiority which dictated its
adoption during the 19 20s and 1930s still prevails in 19 80.
The strategy, then and today, has been adopted out of neces-
sity not volition. While this strategy has the capability
to deal with a major Soviet ground invasion in northeast China
it would not prove effective in dealing with a medium-scale
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and limited-objective attack in more remote and sparsely
132populated regions. Before continuing on to defense alter-
natives it might be helpful to summarize what has been stated
thus far.
First, Deng's retrenchment in arms purchases from abroad
has been in conjunction with moves on the part of Deng
Xiaoping to bring China's modernization effort in line with
economic reality. That reality is, of course, that China
lacks the foreign currency with which to purchase mass quanti-
ties of technology; it does not have the infrastructure to
support industrialization goals; and, there were too few
qualified managers and planners left after the Cultural
Revolution to give direction to, and manage efficiently,
China's modernization.
Secondly, in a move that is both political and economic
in purpose, Deng has in response, subordinated military needs
to those of the civilians sector in an effort to realign
industrial production and achieve civilian control over the
military. This, in turn, has only perpetuated China's de-
fensive weaknesses in the face of ever-increasing Soviet
military superiority.
Lastly, to offset China's lack of military modernization
Deng has had to seek solace in a defensive strategy that is
predicated on three assumptions: 1) Moscow will remain mil-
itarily overcommitted; 2) ties with the West will counter
Soviet hegemony; and 3) China can thwart Russian aggression
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with its archaic luring deep strategy. As discussed above,
these assumptions are tenuous at best and leave China's
security highly questionable.
C. XINJIANG: CHINA'S ACHILLES HEEL
As stated previously, the PRC is most vulnerable to a
limited-objective strike by Soviet forces in its more remote
regions which are large in area and sparsely populated. Auton-
omous regions such as Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang
Uygur all fit this description to one degree or another.
Because the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region has more
to lose in the way of strategic resources and due to its
geographical location, it is the most vulnerable, of the
three.
1. Factors Favoring Soviet Forces
When one attempts to establish a defense strategy
there has to be a specific threat in mind with which to
base weapons procurement upon. In the case of Xinjiang,
Soviet tactics, geography, indigenous population, and his-
torical precedence are all determinants of a likely threat
scenario that would have to be defended against.
Soviet tactics: One finds that with the exception
of the utilization of a massive airlift capability Soviet
tactics have changed little over the years. Conventionally,
on the ground, Soviet doctrine still stresses the elements




equipment and firepower. Over the years the USSR has
developed an extensive capability through the deployment of
its heavily armored and highly mobile motorized infantry units.
Based on their most recent experience in geographically -
similar Afghanistan, China could expect the Soviets to utilize
these units in the XUAR.
Geography: Xinjiang shares a long and contiguous
geographic border with the Soviet Union. Over the years,
the Soviets have demonstrated a keen interest in areas adjacent
to that border through involvement ranging from economic
investment to military intervention. During the 1960's and
19 70 's numerous border skirmishes were fought at various
locations along its length.
Xinjiang is composed of two large basin areas: the
Junggar and the Tarim which are each enclosed by imposing
mountain ranges. While providing natural protective barriers
the Junggar' s western ranges also have several easily acces-
sible passes such as the Yili River Valley, Alataw Shankou
(Dzungarian Gate) , and Turugart Shankou which have tradition-
ally provided for population and military movements from
Turkestan into China and vice versa.
Looking towards China Proper in the east, access is
via several hundred miles of desolate Gobi Desert. Because
of the arduous terrain which separates Xinjiang all direct
traffic must transit through the narrow Hoxi Corridor (Gansu
Corridor) which historically has been referred to as the
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"choke point" for hostile invasion from the west. Today,
transport to Xinjiang from China's heartland is still tenuous
at best and involves approximately three days travel time on
a single track vintage railway or lone highway. Transport
reliability on either is wholly dependent on weather condi-
tions in the region.
Indigenous Population: In total, there are over ten
different ethnic groups living in Xinjiang. While many are
indigenous, some are either refugees from Soviet Turkestan
or nomadic herdsmen caught on one side of the controlled
Sino-Soviet border and unable to return. Although each of
these people exhibits their own ethos most have had at least
two things in common: Islam and a fierce sense of independence
Under Chinese rule, these two elements have been combined
to produce a vitriolic anti-Han sentiment which, over the
years, has manifested itself in several violent Moslem re-
volts which the USSR has been quick to exploit.
In order to diffuse Xinjiang's volatile situation,
Beijing has attempted various programs including mass trans-
fer of Han Chinese to minority populated areas, openly
criticizing "big Han chauvinism" (racial prejudice) , stres-
sing cultural identities, and encouraging minority parti-
cipation in local government. While well-intentioned, these
programs have met with limited success at best. Minority
participation in government remains at a token level, cul-
tural animosity is still prevelant, and most Han sent to
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Xinjiang view it as the "outback" and have been less than
enthusiastic over their forced transfers. Additionally,
many of the people transferred to Xinjiang over the years
have included in their ranks hardened criminals, captured
Nationalist troops, and dissidents.
By the end of the Cultural Revolution, Xinjiang's non-
Han population had swelled from being third in size to first
and comprising 50% of the region's totol population. That
figure has since begun a continuous decline as many of the
Han are now returning to their original home regions in the
east. Today, Han Chinese make up a declining 40% of Xinjiang's
13512 million people.
With the above in mind one must closely examine mili-
tary defense forces in the region which are of necessity
dependent upon local militia for reinforcement and support.
Without going into detail on PLA troop deployment, it should
be noted that in comparison to other regions of China, there
are fewer divisions deployed in Xinjiang Military Region
(which is the largest in terms of land area) than in any other
region (see Figure 5.1). It must be also be noted that
troops and equipment sent to Xinjiang have traditionally
not been of the highest caliber. The best equipment and man-
power has been retained in Shenyang Military Region and,
more recently, dispersed to the Guangzhou Military Region
in the southeast. Consequently, the role of the militia




Military ragion boundary Internal administrative boundary
Military ragion capital Intarnal administrative capital
Figure 5. 1
Source: CIA Map no. 504119 4-79 (541790)
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that a sizeable number amongst the Han-led militia's ranks
are drawn from indigenous ethnic minorities. In his soon to
be published book, From Muskets to Missiles , Harlan Jencks
has called into question both the fighting capability and
allegiance to Han leadership of Xinjiang's militia in view
of the fact it is comprised mainly of minorities and social
13 6
rejects. Although the militia cannot be altogether dis-
counted as a fighting force its effectiveness in time of
war has to be uncertain.
Historical Precedence: The final element which must
be considered is the historical precedence for Russian in-
volvement in Xinjiang. The Russians have been involved in
the XUAR for over 10 years and this involvement has ranged
in scope from military intervention, support for local in-
dependence moves, stationing of permanent troops, to the
exploration for and extraction of petroleum and other
resources. For many years the warlords of Xinjiang and
Moscow negotiated trade and loan agreements and exchanged
consulates without the cognizance of Chinese government in
Beijing. In fact, it wasn't until 1962 that Soviets were
137forced to leave the region at the behest of Mao Zedong.
However, by that time they had gained a good amount of know-
ledge about the XUAR's geographical features, minority
problems and strategic resources.
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2. A Scenario for Intervention
With the above information in mind, it is now possible
to put forth a scenario which describes how a Soviet attack
might proceed. It must be understood that there are many
variations of this scenario, but they all have certain com-
monalties: surprise, speed, mobile armor and limited access
routes into the XUAR.
Starting in the west through strategic passes would
come the main thrust of 10 to 15 Soviet motorized infantry
divisions. A number of thrusts and feints could be made
through the Yili River valley, Dzungarian Gates, Turugart
Shankou or the Buran region (see Figure 5.2). All afford
terrain accessibility which is similar to or easier than that
encountered by the Soviets in Afghanistan. Each pass is
within 200 Km of Soviet cities which are serviced by rail,
13 8
road and air thus making them possible staging areas.
Once through the mountain passes tracked vehicles
would not be confined to roadways as the Junggar Basin
is, for the most part, a vast expanse of flat arid desert -
well-suited to tank warfare. Additionally, the hard packed
soil of much of Xinjiang could provide unimproved landing
areas for Soviet aircraft flying in fuel, ammunition, and
support personnel and equipment.
In concert with the advance in the west a simul-
taneous thrust would probably be made from the Mongolian
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(Hoxi) Corridor - the historical "choke point" through which
all major transportation routes funnel between China Proper
and Xinjiang. They could stage in Altay, thrust south,
refueling in Bayan Ondor, and enter China along the Nei
Mongolia Autonomous Region and Gansu border. From there it
would be a 300 Km drive to the Gansu Corridor where, once in
control, the Soviet forces could effectively isolate Xinjiang
from support and resupply from the eastern military districts
Communications which are likewise tenuous could be severed
leaving the Xinjiang MR isolated from command and control
in Beijing.
Both the east and west invasion routes would easily
be provided air support from numerous Soviet airfields which
surround Xinjiang. Soviet MIG-21s and MIG-23s operating out
of Alma Ata and Altay could provide air support for all in-
vasion routes and overlapping coverage for the central
Dzungarian area which would include Urumqi and Turpan.
Once the western forces had succeeded in breaking
through into the Junggar Basin and the eastern forces had
severed transport and communications links with China Proper,
the two forces in part or whole could merge on Urumqi, by-
passing lesser important cities. Depending on their complete
objectives Xinjiang would more or less be secured as Soviet





Exact figures on troop deployments in China have
never been a matter for public consumption and to complicate
matters, Xinjiang is off the beaten path with much of its
area being restricted in access to foreigners. Therefore,
traveler's tales are not as frequent and intelligence not as
accurate as one would like. However, information regarding
minority problems, Han dissatisfaction with life in Xinjiang,
and general statements of PLA troop deployment can be gleaned
from Chinese open sources. From these and other Western
sources one can piece together a generalized statement of
the Chinese defense posture in Xinjiang.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies
list current military forces in the Urumqi Military Region
(Xinjiang) as six infantry divisions and eight local force
139divisions. While the former can be assumed to be at full
strength in weapons and personnel (see Figure 5.3 for compo-
sition) the latter' s strength is questionable. In the words
of Harvey Nelson, author of The Chinese Military System
,
"...under normal peacetime conditions they are not
maintained at a high level of readiness but are widely
dispersed. For example, and independent regiment is
normally attached to a military subdistrict command,
its subordinate battalions and companies scattered
over several countries engaged in public security,
militia work, or assisting in civil construction.
This provides scant opportunity for large unit
training. "140
At the lowest echelon of defense are the militia
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militia is manned to a large extent by minorities whose
allegiance, as discussed previously, is questionable. The
problem as stated by Professor Lowell Tillet is as follows:
"Those national minorities that live athwart the
Sino-Soviet boundry present particularly difficult
problems for the future. Although the prospect of
independent states for nearly all of the Mongolians,
Kazakh, or Uighurs seems indeed visionary in view of
the constant counter-pressures exerted upon them, there
is another scenario not nearly so improbable. If ten-
sions between the USSR and PRC continue to escalate,
minority leaders may find new leverages. And if the
dispute should come to war. . . large military forces
would be tied down in controlling populations of
doubtful allegiance. "141
In sum, one sixth of China is currently defended by
a core group of 76,0 00 PLA troops equipped with 19 50 vintage
equipment and who are supported by a population that is
militarily organized, but whose loyalty is questionable. In
turn, these defense forces like those in the east are opera-
ting under the luring deep doctrine and are prepared to make
their stand at the heavily fortified city of Urumqi. With
the existing military vulnerabilities it is debatable whether
or not Soviet forces could be "quickly annihilated" once
they had been lured deep.
D. AN ALTERNATIVE
An examination will now be made of the possibilty of
China developing an alternative defense strategy through a
program of limited arms transfers. What is proposed are
selective arms purchases which would be tailored toward a
specific threat in a specific region. The ultimate goal
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would be to maximize risks to the Soviets with minimum costs
to the Chinese. This, of course, is in contrast to the
current strategy which calls for the relinquishment of vast
amounts of territory.
The weapons procured would be allocated to specific units
whose operating doctrine would be based on "relational-man-
euver." Described by Steven L. Canby and Edward N. Luttwak,
the aim of relational-maneuver is to
... optimize terrain advantages, cultural factors and
ad hoc force configurations to exploit identified enemy
weaknesses; such methods are "relational" in the sense
that they are responsive to the local context and the
specific nature of the enemy. . . Since relational-maneuver
methods achieve their effect by deception and fluid action
to achieve first surprise, then shock and finally dis-
ruption, they generate a demand for agile forces of
simple structure (high teeth- to-tail ratios) ... [T]he
motivating dynamics of relational-maneuver methods...
[is to] avoid the attritive clash of strength precisely
because it is only by exploiting specialized or local-
ized superiorities that an enemy materially superior
overall may be overcome. 142
Weapons purchased with relational-maneuver in mind would
not only give existing forces enhanced mobility, but, in
the Chinese case, an enormous increase in firepower. As
these procurements would be specific, limited in scope, and
not entail the reequipping of whole armies, their cost in
the overall Chinese defense budget would be manageable.
In selecting weapons to compliment this strategy several
considerations have to be made:
1) what weapons would be required to thwart a Soviet
combined arms thrust; 2) which suppliers have and are
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willing to export these weapons; and 3) whether or not China
can absorb both the technology and costs involved.
1. ATGM Units; An Effective Response
It must be assumed that China would prefer to stop
the Soviets prior to their breaking through the strategic
mountain passes into Xinjiang. To accomplish this the PLA
will require an anti-tank weapon that is mobile in a variety
of terrain, easily concealed so as to maintain the element
of surprise, and capable of engaging tanks at stand-off dis-
tances. Currently, there are several systems on the world
market which meet these requirements - the British Swingfire
,
the French/German HOT , and the American TOW (see Appendix C
for weapons descriptions and suppliers)
.
In a recent article, "Can Western Europe be Defended
143by Conventional Means?," LT Colonel Norbert Hannig suggests
an alternate means of defending against a Soviet tank attack
in Europe which, in this author's opinion, would be applica-
ble to Xinjiang as well. Because his strategy is centered
around small, mobile anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) units
it would fit easily with relational-maneuver doctrine.
Colonel Hannig' s proposal entails the equipping of
combat militia units with anti-tank missiles (both long and
short range) as their main weapon. Additionally, these
units would be armed with man-portable, low-level air-defense
missiles to defend against helos and ground support aircraft
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The stabilized platforms on which the ATGMs are
mounted can take many forms from inexpensive wheeled vehicles
(trucks and jeeps) to the more costly tracked vehicle. Choice
would depend on availability of roads and the terrain on
which the enemy will be engaged. For China a mix of both
wheeled and tracked vehicles would be preferred because of
the limited number of roads and the variable terrain features.
China, at present, manufactures jeep- type vehicles and armed
personnel carriers (the M-1967 or K-63) which could possibly
be utilized in this role.
Organizationally, Hannig suggests these units would
require a personnel strength of five officers plus 130 en-
listed men to operate 36 stabilized firing platforms, each
with four launch tubes, and a total 864 ATGMs and 9 air-
defense missiles. These units would operate on a more or
less independent basis rather than formally belonging to an
artillery or infantry division. The Chinese who are
experienced at operating in small independent units would
have little trouble adopting this organization.
Expense-wise, Hannig estimates the cost for equipping
individual units - considering only the cost of the ATGM
platforms and missiles - to be around $37 million. Contrasted
with the cost of a Soviet tank division (the attacking force
that a defensive unit could destroy) which Hannig estimates





Of course, costs for China would vary according to
several factors. On the lower side, China would not neces-
sarily require 36 platforms per unit as many of the invasion
routes are too narrow to accommodate that many. As well,
the Chinese produce several vehicles which could be utilized
as stabilized platforms thereby saving them the higher costs
of importing.
The factor which raises the cost for China is the
fact that the prices quoted above are for NATO countries
purchasing NATO produced weapons. Beijing could not hope to
purchase them at those prices. As mentioned earlier, arms
exporters are not about to give away technology to a poten-
tial market rival.
As a rough estimate it would cost China around $500
million to purchase 20 complete ATGM units (This figure was
arrived at by doubling the price quotes in open sources of
sales to Western nations) . Not a figure to be sneezed at,
it is, considering China's $56 billion defense budget for
19 80, a manageable amount. This is especially true when one
figures that these units could deter a medium-scale attack
by the Soviets (15-20 divisions)
.
2. Deployment Tactics
These ATGM units would be based at strategically
located sites at the base of mountain passes. There they
would train and prepare for rapid deployment to the passes
themselves. In fact, several units from each base camp could
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be rotated to probable engagement areas so as to maintain a
higher state of readiness.
Should a Soviet advance be discovered these units
would position themselves with the short-range weapons cam-
ouflaged and stationed ahead of the long-range weapons. In
this way invading forces could be slowed or halted beyond
their own effective firing ranges and then attacked by shorter
ranged weapons. Several of these units could be situated at





China is currently at a critical point in its economic,
social and military development. How Beijing proceeds over
the next few years will determine China's future as a nation
state and international power for decades to come. Unlike
years past when Mao attempted to force social/economic change
through massive and terribly disruptive campaigns, Beijing
can no longer afford to absorb the debilitating side effects
of such mass movements. Contrarily, what the Deng- led govern-
ment needs more than anything is a period of internal stabil-
ity and freedom from external interference. To achieve this
Deng Xiaoping is faced with the difficult task of satisfying
the needs of the military, Maoist holdover officials, and
the populace at large.
The military, or barrel out of which power grows, has
seen both its authority and budget trimmed over the past few
years. The Maoist holdovers have seen many of their comrades
purged or locked up and whole government programs instituted
which only five years ago would have been branded as capital-
istic and anti-socialist. The general populace which, in
the end, may prove the most difficult to placate have, with
the opening of China to the West, been exposed to a massive
influx of material goods and a whole new world of living
standards - most of which lay beyond their means.
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The most logical course that Deng can pursue is to get
China's economy on an even keel and on the path towards steady
growth. Only if the economy grows can Beijing satisfy the
masses' consumer expectations, meet the demands of defense
for a modernized military and, in turn, disarm Maoist
opposition.
No mean task, it none- the- less can be accomplished. How-
ever, it will require a large input of capital investment
into both the infrastructural sectors of industry and the
development of additional resource reserves.
At present, China is finding it increasingly difficult
to supply both domestic consumption and export demands for
increased energy resources. The reason for this is twofold.
First, existing transport and processing facilities - pipe-
lines, railroads, harbor facilities and petro-chemical plants
are proving inadequate in the face of increased demands.
And secondly, known resource reserves such as the eastern
oil fields are proving to be not inexhaustible. Production
growth rates which in the past were marked by increased
capacities have now begun to level off and even decline.
New offshore fields are not only risky ventures, but expen-
sive to the point of becoming cost prohibitive.
So, even if a more efficient infrastructure were built
it is doubtful that existing energy reserves could keep up
with increased demands from both domestic and foreign con-
sumers. Sooner or later Beijing is going to have to turn
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toward Xinjiang for its needs. Xinjiang offers extensive
energy resources in known locations which are more easily
extracted than those currently being sought offshore. Addi-
tionally, the XUAR's population is small, less industrialized
and, therefore, not a great resources consumer. Basically,
whatever is extracted is available for export to China Proper
or abroad.
Before any serious effort at developing the region can
be attempted Beijing will have to take a long hard look at
regional defense. Today, the strongest factor in Xinjiang's
defense is the fact that it offers the Soviets little in the
way of gains should they decide to intervene militarily in
the region. The Soviets have always operated on the premise
that the gains should justify the risks. Moscow is not about
to risk becoming involved in a major war with China just to
conquer a desert basin. There has to be more such as the
capture and control of major industrial centers or resource
reserves which, by their loss, could contribute to economic
chaos and/or a political upheaval in China.
So what options for Xinjiang's defense are open to Deng?
In lieu of a modernized army China has been forced to rely
on a luring deep strategy in the northeast which requires a
large concentration of manpower and therefore prevents the
transfer of large forces to the northwest. Besides, it is
doubtful that China would attempt to permanently station a
sizeable military force in such a remote and isolated region as
Xinjiang. Not only would the logistics of such a deployment be
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difficult, but morale in this, a basically alien region,
could prove to be a problem of major proportions. In the
past large influxes of Han have been met with opposition
from the minorities and discontent on the part of the re-
located Chinese themselves. Transferring large numbers of
military forces would only create more problems than it would
resolve.
A more viable solution lies in the equipping of existing
local forces with modern anti-tank weapons which would in-
crease their fire power tremendously and, in the process,
escalate the cost or risk factor to the Soviets. The cost
to the Chinese would be both manageable within existing
budget constraints and minimal compared to other options.
Additionally, a limited weapons acquisition program of this
sort would have a technology spin-off effect that would
enable the Chinese to eventually produce their own copy of
these imported systems.
Defensively speaking, forces equipped with ATGMs would
be highly mobile, capable of attaining surprise and shock
effect and, most importantly, would have the ability to
inflict heavy enemy losses on a cost effective basis.
Xinjiang's geography, which forms a natural barrier, could
be exploited so that ATGM-equipped forces could engage a
potential invader in the limited access routes through which
they would have to pass.
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To complete the defense picture in Xinjiang, Beijing will
also have to secure the allegiance and trust of the indigenous
population. To accomplish this the minorities will have to
be given the recognition, responsibility and regional author-
ity that is rightfully theirs. This, of course, cannot be
accomplished forthwith in a region so strategically important
as Xinjiang. It will take time and patience to achieve the
mutual trust and respect required on the part of both Han
and minority. The policies instituted by Deng, thus far,
seem to be directed toward that end. What is required still
yet are continued policies that are consistent in applica-
tion and rational in content. What is not needed is another
destabilizing Great Leap or Cultural Revolution.
In summary, Xinjiang, with its cornucopia of resources
can play a major role in the success of China's four modern-
izations. This will require a rational approach on the part
of Beijing towards the indigenous nationalities and a redress
of the region's defense vulnerabilities. Otherwise, Xinjiang
will remain as it is today — remote, underdeveloped and,
militarily, China's Achilles Heel.
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Swingfire is a long-range command-controlled anti-tank
weapon system capable of engaging and destroying the
heaviest armor. The missile is wire-commanded with sig-
nals being generated by an operator's joystick control.
An important feature of the system is its ability to
operate with the launcher concealed behind cover in such
a way that there is no clear optical sight-line from
launcher to target. The operator can be stationed a
considerable distance (up to 10 0m) from the launcher.
The Swingfire can be fitted on numerous types of wheeled
and tracked vehicles. The missiles themselves are pre-
packed in hermetically sealed launcher boxes making it
a panclimatic system. It employs a hollow charge war-
head and has a min/max range of 150m/400m. 145
As far as exporting weapons to the PRC, Britain has, with
its sale of Rolls-Royce Spey engines and negotiations for
Harrier aircraft, proven itself amenable if not eager to pur-
146
sue the matter despite COCOM decisions to the contrary.
Their defense industries depend on foreign arms sales for 25%
of its business which, in turn, helps to pay for R&D and
extends production runs. With the high cost of technology
and a relatively small armed forces, Great Britain will con-
tinue to have good reason to pursue arms transfers to China.
HOT (French/German
HOT is a long-range command-controlled anti-tank weapon
system capable of engaging and destroying the heaviest
armor. The missile is wire-guided. The system can be




It employs a hollow charge warhead and has a min/mak
range of 75m to more than 4 Km. The HOT system has
gained wide acceptance amongst NATO countries and is
becoming the main ATGM system in many forces. 147
The main exporter France, has been haggling with the PRC
for HOT missile sales since 1977. To date, a deal has yet
to be firmed up.
TOW (U.S.)
The weapon system is similar to Swingfire and HOT, but
because of current restrictions on weapons system's sales to
China, TOW will not be discussed.
B. Air-Defense Missiles
Blowpipe (U.K.)
Blowpipe is a surface-to-air weapon for unit self-defense
in forward areas against close-range low- level air attack
To carry out this role effectively the equipment is com-
pact, light, and simple so that it can be carried and
operated by one man. The weapon is suitable for use in
extremes of climate with no maintenance needed during
long periods in the field. The Blowpipe system is
entirely self-contained with no external power require-
ments. It can be used against both attacking and re-
ceding fast aircraft and helicopter targets. 1^8
To date no known negotiations on Blowpipe have taken
place between Great Britain and China.
RBS-70 (Sweden)
RBS-70 is a portable surface-to-air missile system which
is substantially immune to jamming. It is suitable for
use aaainst both fighter-bombers and helicopters and has
a range of about 5 Km. With the accompaning training
equipment an average AA soldier can be fully trained





Sweden and China have discussed or negotiated the sale of
aircraft (Viggen) , AA guns (BOFI 40 mm) , and surface-to-air
149
missiles (RBS-70) . As of this date, none have come to
fruition. Sweden, which depends on arms exports for much
the same reason as Britain, seems to be willing to sell if
China wants to buy.
C. Short Range Anti-Tank Missiles
Importation of these weapons will not be discussed as the
Chinese are currently producing an indigenous copy of the
Soviet "SAGGER" ATGM, a design that entered Soviet service
in 19 65. It is the author's opinion that the Chinese will
produce this weapon in sufficient numbers so as to to elim-
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